VII – The PCI and the center-left, Togliatti’s death and Luigi Longo’s secretaryship (1960‑1968)

With the country's economic boom, new policies aimed at the redistribution of wealth became necessary so that the working class, by improving its standard of living, could also "consume" Italian products. The involvement of at least a part of the political representation of the working class in these new choices then became an unavoidable element, and the PSI, starting in 1956, began, distancing itself from the PCI, to approach the DC.

The new turning point in Italian politics was the result of the work of the Apulian statesman Aldo Moro who, with sudden accelerations and abrupt decelerations, set the pace for the rapprochement operation, with the Fanfani Government, also known as the "parallel convergences" government, and the entry of Nenni's socialists, with his three Governments from 1963 to 1968. The PCI, in its majority[1], while aware that the centre-left would put an end to the unity of the workers' forces, identified a ** more advanced terrain of struggle** in the new political framework, and this position was strengthened by the X Congress of the PCI which, held in December 1962, besides strongly supporting the establishment of the new Regional Authority and the expansion of the powers of local autonomies in general, dwelt at length on the potential of the new political phase. The main objective that Togliatti's PCI asked of the centre-left should have been the implementation of the Constitution[2].

The PCI's political line in these years towards the Government could be summarized as "soft" opposition in Parliament, but which returned to being harsh in the squares and in the Country[3]. This position brought undeniable benefits to the PCI and the 1963 elections[4] saw a consistent advance of the communists. The brilliant result, achieved despite the constant decline in membership in recent years, demonstrated that the PCI had begun to gain consensus even beyond its traditional electorate and that it had made the most of the new political spaces that had been created with the entry of the PSI into the Government. With these elections, the PCI, making inroads also into the so-called opinion electorate, began that ascent which in a few years would lead the Party to constantly decrease the distance from the DC until the possibility, which occurred only in the European elections of 1984, of achieving the long-awaited "overtaking". Besides a slight decline for the socialists, it should be remembered, from that election round, the large shift of votes from the DC to the PLI (Italian Liberal Party), which gained 3.5% of the votes compared to 1958, reaching 7%. A substantial slice of the electorate had not appreciated the DC's shift to the left and had moved to the more reassuring, and more conservative, liberal shores.

In subsequent years, Aldo Moro's aim became clearer: to keep the Christian Democratic "centrality" intact, and it can be affirmed that at least that objective was achieved if one considers the programmatic contents, which were not properly reformist, of the governments and the difficulties the PSI encountered in those years, crushed between the DC and the PCI, in justifying its role in Government[5]. The PCI, fearing that a successful centre-left could strengthen the "convention ad excludendum" against it, calmed down when it acknowledged the difficulties of the Moro Governments[6] and resumed its maneuvers by continually attacking the PSI and working to push the left wing of that same party towards a split.

On August 21, 1964, Palmiro Togliatti died in Yalta. His funeral, which saw the participation of over a million people, constituted the most imposing moment of popular participation that the young Italian Republic had known up to that moment. Togliatti's last document, which constituted the political testament of the "Migliore" (Best) and was remembered as the "Yalta memorial," reiterated the originality and diversity of paths that would allow the construction of socialist societies, the "unity in diversity" of the international communist movement.

The PCI left by Togliatti was a Party which, while continuing to remain anchored to "democratic centralism," began to feel the need to make visible the different sensibilities and political options within it. The first Congress after the death of the "Migliore," the XI held in January 1966, was the scene of the first confrontation that took place "in broad daylight" since the birth of the New Party. The two political lines that faced each other were the "right" of Amendola, who demanded unity with the socialists and an urgent reform of the State Institutions in the direction of greater democratic participation, and the "left" of Ingrao, who saw mass organization as the best response to the new workers' conflictuality that had re-emerged in those years. Amendola, although he did not have an absolute majority on his own, put Ingrao in the minority. Ingrao's dissenting vote, due to the authority of the communist exponent who enjoyed widespread consensus both inside and outside the Party, sanctioned, for the first time, the legitimacy of political dissent.

The work of synthesis, aimed at "renewal in continuity," between the different souls of the Party sealed the leadership of Luigi Longo, elected General Secretary after Togliatti's death and a worthy successor to the policies of the deceased leader. The two strongest candidates for the role of Togliatti's successor were Amendola and Ingrao, but Longo, for the guarantees of unity and continuity provided by his figure, who had held the position of deputy secretary with Togliatti and had always loyally and effectively assisted the Secretary, constituted the best solution for the Party's secretariat[7]. As Armando Cossutta rightly recalled, "if Togliatti was the great protagonist of the political line and strategy of the communists, Longo was the intelligent constructor of it"[8]. From then on, the task of assisting Longo was entrusted to the young Enrico Berlinguer. It was clear to everyone that the Party, with that move, had already chosen its future leader[9]. But on the other hand, despite the Ingrao case being considered of undoubted political and historical value, the events of the following years, primarily the affair of the "Manifesto" group, demonstrated that the road that should have led the PCI to overcome the method of "democratic centralism" was still entirely ahead of it.

The 1968 elections[10] clearly showed that the main losers in the centre-left Governments were the socialists. To give greater strength to the left area that was governing the Country and to definitively isolate the PCI, the PSI and the PSDI had formed the PSU (Unified Socialist Party). The new party, which set the ambitious goals of competing with the communists for the hegemony of the left on the one hand and creating the conditions for the "alternative to the DC" on the other, was soundly defeated in the electoral round of May of one of the "hottest" years in Italian history. The PSU obtained, also due to the split of the left wing of the PSI which formed the PSIUP[11], much less than the sum of what the two parties composing it had obtained in the previous elections, and the debacle led to the decline of the "third force" option and, shortly thereafter, to a new split between the PSI and the PSDI. On the other hand, the DC recovered, probably on its right, 0.8%, while the true winners were the communists, who derived the greatest advantages from the centre-left's lack of answers and slowly continued their ascent, dismissing all the rumored hypotheses of crisis.

[1] Cf. Rossanda “La ragazza del secolo scorso”, Einaudi.
[2] Cf. Agosti op. cit.
[3] Cf. Colarizi op. cit.
[4] Results of the major parties in the elections for the Chamber of Deputies, April 28, 1963:
PCI 25.3% – DC 38.3% – PSI 13.8%.
The PCI obtained 175 seats in the Chamber and 85 in the Senate.
[5] Cf. Rossanda op. cit.
[6] Aldo Moro, unanimously considered among the best Italian politicians, was not equally great as a statesman. His eternal mediations, which had achieved numerous and indisputable political successes, clashed with the need for immediate decision-making typical of someone in government. Cf. Pietra “Moro fu vera gloria?”, Garzanti, cf. Andreotti op. cit., cf. Colarizi op. cit.
[7] Cf. Rossanda op. cit.
[8] Cossutta, op. cit.
[9] Supporting Longo in the Party’s leadership was an opportunity for Berlinguer to mature before assuming the most prestigious office. Berlinguer’s weight continued to grow in the following years, also due to Longo’s illness in the later years of his secretaryship, which prevented full political activity.
[10] Results of the major parties in the elections for the Chamber of Deputies, May 19, 1968:
PCI 26.9% – DC 39.1% – PSU 14.5%.
The PCI obtained 177 seats in the Chamber and 101 in the Senate (with the PSIUP).
[11] The majority part of the PSIUP merged into the PCI in 1972. Of its two internal minorities, the larger formed the PDUP and the smaller returned to the PSI.