V – The PCI between government, the Constituent Assembly and the defeat of 18 April 1948 (1946–1948)

The New Party in 1946, after the Liberation, could be considered a reality. The PCI, with its two million members[1], had become the largest mass party in post-war Italy, with exceptional roots in the "red regions"[2], with good strength in the working-class cities of the north and constantly growing in the southern countryside. Paradoxically, the imposing organizational structure did not translate into an identical electoral strength, as in the elections for the Constituent Assembly on June 2, 1946[3], the PCI was clearly surpassed by the DC (Christian Democracy) and, by a few thousand votes, by the PSI (Italian Socialist Party), securing 4,300,000 preferences. The PCI exclusively obtained the consensus of its militants or sympathizers, almost all workers, peasants, or intellectuals, and failed to exert any attractive force towards other social classes, primarily towards the "middle class"[4].

The greatest responsibilities were attributed to the "duplicity" (doppiezza) of the PCI, in other words, that equivocal attitude which was considered unconvincing, and which held together two opposing political visions: the commitment to democratic institutions, which characterized the official line, and the link with the Soviet Union and revolutionary aspirations, conspicuously present among the grassroots and peripheral leaders. Indeed, in the Party militants, the usual dualism that has always characterized the left emerged once again, and persisted for many years, between the so-called "heart," which dreamed of the Revolution and the "Myth of the Soviet Union," and the "brain," which studied the modalities for achieving democracy.

Togliatti, personally, strongly opposed initiatives that exceeded the official line, fearing that they would nullify the important efforts made by the PCI to gain credibility and to be a force that could aspire to democratically achieve the government of the Country. Togliatti, in truth, pursued the democratic choice consistently, and not with "duplicity," as it assumed a strategic value for him, and this choice must not be confused with a "merely parliamentary and legalistic path"[5]. Furthermore, Togliatti, considering the small parties almost superfluous[6], preferred close relations with the other two mass parties, and his political line materialized with the achievement of trade union unity[7], with participation and support for national Governments[8], from 1944 to 1947, and with the climate of collaboration established within the Constituent Assembly. That the fear of being politically marginalized pushed the PCI to seek these convergences is unquestionable[9], but, similarly, the equally undisputed benefits that this political line brought to the young Italian democracy are not questionable.

However, the collaboration in government between the left and the DC did not last long. The difficulties of maintaining policies that were not exactly "popular," typical of a period of austerity like the post-war era, were felt by the left, and especially by the PCI. At the same time, the pressures on the DC from the most conservative wings of the Church and, even more so from the Americans, which manifested themselves clearly in De Gasperi's famous trip to the USA in January 1947, became very strong and no longer avoidable. In fact, Italy, due to its economic fragility, needed financial aid, and the USA made this aid conditional on the Trentino statesman driving the left out of government. The turning point was ratified in May 1947 with the formation of a new De Gasperi Cabinet without the PCI and the PSI: from that moment on, the PCI never re-entered the Government of Italy.

Unlike what happened in the governmental majority, the Constituent Assembly continued its work in the same climate of collaboration, and those days were remembered as one of the finest pages in Italian political history. Palmiro Togliatti’s political foresight should be noted, as evidenced by some sensational positions[10], prioritizing, above all, the birth and growth of Italian democracy, of which the PCI was intended to be one of the pillars. Togliatti, who greatly feared the possible reactions of the Party's grassroots to being kicked out of the government, gave this "democratic response" to disprove all those who asserted that "once communists are in power, they never leave it"[11].

The efforts were rewarded, and in January 1948, the new Constitution was approved, very "advanced" in principles and contents, and its complete implementation represented the main political program that the PCI leveraged in its subsequent forty-five years of life. The political line of the PCI was not liked by the other communist parties, which, at the Szklarska Poreba Conference in Poland in September 1947[12], with particular intensity, especially from the Yugoslav party, put the entire PCI leadership group on trial, which was led by Luigi Longo on that occasion. In this case too, Togliatti, reluctantly, implemented yet another change of direction aimed at conforming the PCI's positions to those of the other communist forces. At the VI Congress of the PCI, held in Milan in January 1948, the original idea of an "Italian path to Socialism" was "set aside" and the organization's propensity towards the "Party of Cadres" more consistent with Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy was accentuated.

The PSI went through an even deeper crisis during that period. The Palazzo Barberini split in January 1947, carried out by Saragat's social democratic group, and which weakened the PSI by at least a third of its electoral consensus, caused a wound in Italy's oldest party that, in fact, was never healed. This event handed over the hegemony of the Italian left to the PCI, from that moment on, and created a reversal in the balance of power atypical for Western Europe, where the presence of a hegemonic and governing Socialist Party and a subordinate Communist Party was more common. Political analysts identified one of the main causes of the blocking of the Italian political system in this "all-Italian" anomaly, defined by the terms "imperfect bipartisanship" or "polarized pluralism," unique in Europe and in democratic countries for not being characterized by that vital democratic mechanism which is alternation[13]. If, on the one hand, with the split, Saragat's PSLI[14] joined the ranks of the small parties gravitating around the DC, creating a very cohesive moderate bloc, on the other hand, Nenni's PSI strengthened the already solid relations with the PCI[15].

The atmosphere leading up to the elections of April 18, 1948[16], was one of a genuine showdown. Two opposing ideas of society faced each other: the left leveraged the sense of vindication of workers and peasants, while the DC, to also win the consensus of those who were not its traditional voters, focused entirely on anti-communism and the values of democracy and freedom[17]. The DC, thanks also to the political help of the Church, which moved its entire imposing structure, and the not just economic help of the USA[18], emerged victorious from that epochal clash, obtaining an absolute majority of seats in Parliament. The Popular Democratic Front, which presented itself with a single symbol bearing the effigy of Garibaldi, remained far below the sum of the votes obtained by the PCI and the PSIUP in 1946. The excessively negative result of the Front is explained not only by the birth of Saragat's list but also by an "Italian political custom": the merger of multiple lists often produces fewer votes than the sum of the individual lists. The victory of the DC in those elections represented a decisive moment in the country's history. Italy decided on April 18, 1948, to be an integral part of the Western camp, and the vote also had the effect of consolidating a democracy based on a multiplicity of parties, and which definitively rejected, unlike the countries of Eastern Europe, the option of socialist democracy.

[1] Membership data show that the PCI exceeded two million members until 1956.
Specifically, PCI membership figures from 1946 to 1956 were:
1946: 2,068,272 members; 1947: 2,252,446; 1948: 2,115,232; 1949: 2,027,271; 1950: 2,112,593; 1951: 2,097,830; 1952: 2,093,540; 1953: 2,134,285; 1954: 2,145,317; 1955: 2,090,006; 1956: 2,035,353.
Cf. Istituto Cattaneo – Archivio Adele (web sources).

[2] In order of importance for PCI grassroots support: Emilia-Romagna, Tuscany, and Umbria.

[3] The Constituent Assembly elections were held on the same day as the referendum that, with 54% of the vote, marked the beginning of the republican era and the end of the monarchy.
Results of the three major parties in the elections for the Constituent Assembly of 2 June 1946:
PCI 18.9% – DC 35.2% – PSI 20.7%.
The PCI obtained 104 seats in the Constituent Assembly.

[4] Cf. Agosti, Storia del Pci, Editori Laterza.

[5] Cf. Pistillo, Pagine di storia del Partito Comunista Italiano, Lacaita Editori.

[6] Cf. Andreotti, Visti da vicino, Rizzoli.
Giulio Andreotti recounts having heard Togliatti state, during a meeting involving all antifascist parties: “small parties, small ideas”.

[7] From 1944, the CGIL (Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro) was re-established through the united commitment of the three main currents: communist, socialist, and Catholic.
National Secretaries of the CGIL from the post-war period until the end of the PCI were: Di Vittorio (1944–1957), Novella (1957–1970), Lama (1970–1986), Pizzinato (1986–1988), Trentin (1988–1994).

[8] PCI ministers in the Bonomi, Parri, and De Gasperi governments were: Togliatti, Scoccimarro, Gullo, Ferrari, Pesenti, Sereni.
Cf. Almanacco Pci 75 and Almanacco Pci 76, Sezione centrale stampa e propaganda Pci.

[9] Cf. Agosti, op. cit.

[10] One PCI position during the Constituent Assembly that caused friction even with the Socialists was the decision not to oppose the continued validity of the Lateran Pacts.
Cf. Colarizi, Storia dei partiti nell’Italia repubblicana, Editori Laterza.

[11] Cf. Pistillo, op. cit.

[12] The conference established an Information Bureau (Cominform), which effectively replaced the Comintern.
Cf. Agosti, op. cit.

[13] Cf. Galli, Storia del Pci, Kaos edizioni; Galli, Il bipartitismo imperfetto. Comunisti e democristiani in Italia, il Mulino; Sartori, Teoria dei partiti e caso italiano, SugarCo.

[14] The PSLI later changed its name to PSDI.

[15] Relations between the PCI and the PSI were already very close before the Liberation, to the point that a merger between the two parties was proposed several times.
Cf. Longo, Ipotesi di una fusione tra comunisti e socialisti and Per la creazione del partito unico della classe operaia e dei lavoratori, essays in I comunisti e l’unità della classe operaia, edited by the PCI Central Party Schools Section.

[16] Results of the two main lists in the elections for the Chamber of Deputies on 18 April 1948:
Popular Democratic Front 31% – DC 48.5%.
The Popular Democratic Front obtained 187 seats in the Chamber and 72 in the Senate.

[17] Cf. Colarizi, op. cit.

[18] US support for the DC took many forms, ranging from radio messages to letters from Italian emigrants in America.
Cf. Pistillo, op. cit.