IX - The PCI under Berlinguer, from the 1970s to the kidnapping of Aldo Moro (1972-1979)

 With the rise of conservative forces, the PCI urgently needed to overcome political stagnation. The first response came during the XIII Congress in March 1972, when newly appointed General Secretary Enrico Berlinguer proposed a “government of democratic breakthrough” involving collaboration among the three main popular currents: communist, socialist, and Catholic. In this context, leftist unity was a “necessary but not sufficient condition.”

A new turn occurred in 1973 after Pinochet's coup in Chile against Allende’s leftist government. Fearing threats to democracy in Italy, Berlinguer relaunched, via Rinascita, the line of a “Historic Compromise,” an alliance defending democratic institutions among the three popular parties. He saw the Christian Democrats not as a monolithic conservative party but as an evolving force, containing significant popular elements that could be persuaded to cooperate with the PCI. Over the following years, Berlinguer expanded this strategy, proposing an alliance with the DC not only defensive but also programmatic, aiming at a governing majority that could gradually integrate socialist elements by combining Catholic solidarism with communist struggles.

The first tangible results of the “’68 wave” appeared in 1974 with the divorce law referendum. DC leader Fanfani pushed his party toward rigid positions, forcing a referendum the PCI had wanted to avoid. Once the referendum was called, the PCI mobilized fully for the “No” vote, which won overwhelmingly with 60%, showing how Italian society had changed since 1968. Many participants, even non-party members, demonstrated a strong desire for political engagement. During these years, PCI membership grew steadily, and by 1976 it regained the top position in terms of membership, after 13 years under DC.

The leftward shift of the country became clear in the 1975 local elections. Prior to these elections, the PCI only administered the three traditional “red regions” plus a few other provinces and cities outside Emilia, Tuscany, and Umbria. After June 15, 1975, with the PSI and sometimes PSDI and PRI, the PCI governed six regions, half of all provinces, 40% of provincial capitals, one-third of Italian municipalities, and nearly all major cities. For the first time, the PCI surpassed 30% of votes, reaching 33.4% against DC’s 35.2%, making the prospect of overtaking DC increasingly realistic.

The Party leadership elected at the XIV Congress in March 1975 was depleted as many cadres took institutional roles at local levels. The PCI faced governance challenges in regions, provinces, and cities historically ungoverned by the left, with high expectations for change. In the Congress, Berlinguer abandoned the idea of leaving NATO, reinforced the “Historic Compromise” strategy, and emphasized the “moral question,” promoting a renewed sense of state responsibility among parties and politicians.

The 1976 national elections saw DC primacy questioned for the first time. Fear of a “communist takeover” drove moderate voters to DC, while minor parties collapsed. DC retained a relative majority, and the PCI reached its historical peak with 34.4%, still unable to threaten DC supremacy. Yet the electorate polarization between the two main parties, almost three-quarters of votes combined, made cooperation between DC and PCI necessary. The first official step was Pietro Ingrao’s election as Speaker of the Chamber.

Despite US skepticism, DC and PCI, through the tireless work of Aldo Moro and Berlinguer, agreed on a one-party DC government led by Andreotti with PCI abstention. This marked the first time in nearly 30 years the PCI re-entered government, breaking the anti-communist prejudice.

While hoping for broader responsibilities, PCI faced the DC strategy to slow its government integration. Although achieving minor results, the PCI was in the uncomfortable position of responsibility without real power, facing increasing pressure from its base.

The main problems arose from the left, where the split with the extra-parliamentary area deepened. The 1977 popular movement, led by “Autonomia Operaia,” became highly critical of PCI policies, which appeared to adopt a “two-step” strategy subordinating reforms to stabilization. Protests included dramatic incidents, like the expulsion of CGIL secretary Lama from Rome University in February 1977, and widespread violent clashes between demonstrators and police.

The rise of the “Red” terrorist groups further complicated the PCI’s situation, caught between pushing DC for more government responses and assuming responsibility to isolate terrorists. When PCI obtained agreement from DC to join the government majority, the Red Brigades executed Italy’s deadliest terrorist attack: the kidnapping of Aldo Moro.

On March 16, 1978, Parliament debated confidence in the new Andreotti “national solidarity” government, formalizing DC-PCI cooperation. The Red Brigades kidnapped and murdered Aldo Moro, Italy’s leading proponent of the new political agreement. PCI was forced to maintain confidence in a government that failed to deliver promised changes.

PCI disengaged from government in January 1979, paying a high price for the delay. The XV Congress in April 1979 sought to rebuild the Party and promoted a strategy of “democratic alternative” with secular and Catholic forces. Berlinguer reaffirmed the link between democracy and socialism, connecting PCI with other European communist parties, especially French and Spanish, in a movement called “Eurocommunism,” a “third way” between Social Democracy and real socialism.

[1] Cf. Almanacco PCI ‘75, curated by the PCI Central Press and Propaganda Section.
[2] Cf. Agosti, op. cit.
[3] Cf. Veltroni, La sfida interrotta. Le idee di Enrico Berlinguer, Baldini & Castaldi.
[4] Cf. Chiarante, La Democrazia Cristiana, Editori Riuniti.
[5] PCI membership data 1969–1976: 1969: 1,503,816; 1970: 1,507,047; 1971: 1,521,642; 1972: 1,584,659; 1973: 1,623,082; 1974: 1,657,825; 1975: 1,730,453; 1976: 1,814,262. Source cited.
[6] Cf. Almanacco PCI ‘76, curated by the PCI Central Press and Propaganda Section.
[7] PCI only administered six regions simultaneously in 1976. Historical regional councils with PCI presence included: Emilia Romagna, Tuscany, Umbria, Piedmont, Liguria, Lazio, Sardinia, Valle d’Aosta. Sicily (1958–1960) had an atypical majority under ex-DC Silvio Milazzo including PCI support. PCI never administered Lombardy, Veneto, Friuli Venezia Giulia, Trentino-Alto Adige, Marche, Abruzzo, Molise, Campania, Apulia, Basilicata, Calabria.
[8] Leftist provincial councils formed 1975–1976 in 46 of 92 provinces: Alessandria, Turin, Vercelli, Genoa, La Spezia, Savona, Cremona, Mantua, Milan, Pavia, Rovigo, Venice, Bologna, Ferrara, Forlì, Modena, Parma, Piacenza, Ravenna, Reggio Emilia, Arezzo, Florence, Grosseto, Livorno, Pisa, Pistoia, Massa Carrara, Siena, Ancona, Ascoli, Pesaro, Perugia, Terni, Rieti, Pescara, Teramo, Avellino, Naples, Salerno, Matera, Foggia, Taranto, Cagliari, Nuoro, Sassari, Cosenza.
[9] Leftist councils formed 1975–1976 in 39 of 95 provincial capitals: Aosta, Alessandria, Asti, Turin, Vercelli, Genoa, Imperia, La Spezia, Savona, Cremona, Mantua, Milan, Pavia, Venice, Bologna, Ferrara, Forlì, Modena, Parma, Piacenza, Ravenna, Reggio Emilia, Arezzo, Florence, Grosseto, Livorno, Pisa, Pistoia, Massa Carrara, Siena, Ancona, Pesaro, Perugia, Terni, Rome, Rieti, Naples, Sassari, Cosenza.
[10] Leftist administrations 1975–1976: Rome, Milan, Naples, Turin, Genoa, Florence, Bologna; practically all major cities except Palermo, Catania, Bari.
[11] Cf. Cossutta, Stefanini, Zangheri, Decentramento e partecipazione, Editori Riuniti.
[12] Cf. Agosti, op. cit.
[13] Cf. Berlinguer, Attualità e futuro, L’Unità; Veltroni, op. cit.
[14] Cf. Veltroni, op. cit.
[15] 1976 national election results: PCI 34.4%, DC 38.6%, PSI 9.6%; PCI seats: 227 Chamber, 116 Senate.
[16] In subsequent legislatures, assigning the Chamber presidency to PCI, then opposition, became customary. Pietro Ingrao’s seat later taken by Nilde Iotti.
[17] Cf. Gorresio, Pansa, Tornabuoni, Trent’anni dopo. Il regime democristiano nella tempesta, Tascabili Bompiani.
[18] Cf. Rossanda, op. cit.
[19] Cf. Agosti, op. cit.; Rossanda, op. cit.
[20] Cf. AA.VV., Settantasette, DeriveApprodi.
[21] Cf. AA.VV., Settantasette, DeriveApprodi.
[22] Cf. Zavoli, C’era una volta la Prima Repubblica, Mondadori; Zavoli, La notte della Repubblica, L’Unità.
[23] Cf. Agosti, op. cit.
[24] Cf. Berlinguer, op. cit.
[25] Cf. Di Napoli, L’Eurocomunismo tra storia e cronistoria, Edizioni Paoline.