VI – The Attempt on Togliatti, 1956, and the Years of Centrism in Italy (1948–1960)

In the PCI, the terrible defeat of 1948 did not question Togliatti's leadership, and he remained firmly at the helm of the Party, assisted by deputy secretaries Luigi Longo and Pietro Secchia. The Marxist-Leninist organizational structure, which emerged after the VI Congress[1], facilitated the stable, untroubled maintenance of the leadership group, as also demonstrated in the days following July 14, 1948, when Togliatti himself was the victim of an assassination attempt by a young fanatic. It was Longo and Secchia, at least while Togliatti was fighting between life and death, who took charge of the Party and blocked the attempts at insurrection by the grassroots. In fact, the "best organized areas" of the partisan squads were still active, and they still possessed a decent arsenal, which was continuously increasing also because in those days, the police forces were easily disarmed in many cities[2]. When he was out of danger, Togliatti himself, from his hospital bed, hurried to restore order in the Party with the historic phrase in which he asked the grassroots to "remain calm"[3]. The assassination attempt was not without political consequences: Di Vittorio's CGIL, which had proclaimed a general strike immediately after the attack, split due to the subsequent controversy over this decision, and this very event became, inserted into the changed political conditions, the trigger that caused the split of the Catholic current, which gave rise to the Free CGIL, later CISL, and the social democratic and republican current, which founded the UIL[4].

The years of the first Republican Legislature were not simple for the PCI, subjected as it was to the crossfire of the Government and the Church. The Government, even using means like Scelba's "celere" (riot police), systematically repressed the numerous protest initiatives in factories and the countryside organized by the PCI and the CGIL. The Church, which had already played a very active role in the 1948 elections, continued with propaganda against the PCI and the CGIL[5], which culminated in the excommunication of those who professed to be communists or supported the social-communist lists. The unity with the socialists, which continued in the CGIL and in the red administrations present mainly in Emilia, Tuscany, and Umbria, the Marxist-Leninist organization, the struggles in the factories of the center-north and especially in the southern countryside, and an increasing penetration into Italian culture and society, which became evident, for example, in the fights against nuclear power, prevented the PCI from falling into serious isolation. The peace movements, born after the start of the Korean War in 1950, were also very important for the PCI, engaging the entire Party, with the significant participation of the reconstituted FGCI[6], especially after the VII National Congress held in Rome in April 1951.

After a short time, the Party managed to emerge from this defensive position and returned to growth, resuming its phase of expansion, as evidenced by its advance in the administrative elections of 1951 and 1952[7]. But the most obvious signs of recovery were seen later, especially with the political elections of 1953. De Gasperi's DC, implementing quite a few forcing tactics, had a new electoral law approved that granted, to the coalition that exceeded 50% of the votes, a substantial majority premium that allowed it to reach 65% of the seats. The DC's fear of not repeating the exploit of 1948 was evident, and the reaction of the PCI, actively assisted by the CGIL, which called a new general strike against what was renamed the "fraudulent law" (Legge truffa), was fierce. The centrist coalition, by 57,000 votes, did not reach the absolute majority, and the missed goal, along with the strong decline of the DC[8], marked the end of the De Gasperi era. The PCI, capitalizing on a five-year period of social and political struggles[9], surpassed six million votes, but the satisfaction for the dual result achieved—the failure of the fraudulent law and the undisputed primacy in the Italian left, with almost 10 percentage points over the PSI—was short-lived, as the DC was still firmly in government of the Country, and the left overall still played a marginal political role.

Even social changes did not seem to be moving in a direction that would benefit the PCI. The increased demand for labor pushed large masses of workers towards urban centers, to the north, and abroad, and these workers, having immediate serious problems to solve, were little interested in the ideal struggles for social change[10]. Significant in this regard was the victory of the CISL, at the expense of the CGIL, in the elections for the internal commissions of Fiat in 1955. For the communists of the Party and the CGIL, this was an important opportunity for reflection. Di Vittorio delivered a famous self-criticism in the CGIL Directorate that was destined to change the entire organization of the CGIL[11].

In an attempt to emerge from this uncomfortable situation, the left, especially the PSI, attempted an rapprochement with the government area, and the election of Gronchi as President of the Republic with the decisive vote of the left in 1955 and the abstention of the PCI and PSI on the vote of confidence in the Segni Government at the beginning of 1956[12], were the most important political acts of this strategy. There were also changes in the PCI's organization, as the Marxist-Leninist structure had made plain all the limitations it had in fully grasping all the economic and social changes in the Country. Among the major leaders, Secchia paid the price, losing the position of deputy secretary. The ruling class was gradually renewed, while the Party abandoned, at least partially, the Marxist-Leninist organization to increasingly resume the forms of that "new party" so dear to Togliatti.

1956 was a fundamental year in the history of the PCI. With the XX Congress of the Soviet Communist Party, whose leadership had passed, after Stalin's death in 1953, into the hands of Khrushchev, the entire policy of the most important Soviet dictator was severely criticized, and the use of the "cult of personality" was condemned. The reactions of the PCI, at least initially, were prudent and were limited to emphasizing the innovative nature of the Soviet turning point, highlighting, in particular, the correctness of the original choices that the PCI had made in previous years[13]. It was Togliatti, in the following months, with an interview in the newspaper "Nuovi argomenti" (New Arguments), who initiated a turning point in the PCI's position. The "Migliore" (the Best)[14], emphasizing the excessive bureaucratization of the State, unequivocally denounced the "degenerations" of the Soviet system that had led to the cult of personality. With that stance, Togliatti began to question the very idea of the "Soviet model." But the road that was supposed to lead to full autonomy for the PCI was still long, and when the Polish communist government repressed worker demonstrations by force, the PCI leadership aligned itself with the Soviet Party's positions.

Even more serious and full of consequences was the crisis in Hungary. In that country, vibrant protests similar to those that had occurred in Poland had been ongoing for some months. When the Hungarian Government announced its intention to leave the Warsaw Pact, a very violent Soviet repression was unleashed. The Red Army tanks invaded the country and caused several thousand deaths. In this case too, although with even greater suffering, the PCI was forced to align itself, but the political cost of that decision was extremely high. Some sectors of the Party, and especially the trade union, distanced themselves from the PCI's positions. Among the critical positions, those of Di Vittorio and over a hundred intellectuals within or close to the Party who signed a harsh manifesto of condemnation should be remembered. Despite everything, the criticism, due to the special relationship that bound the Party to its militants[15], did not lead to an immediate exit of the majority of those leaders who had expressed perplexity. But throughout Italy, the situation for the PCI became extremely difficult, and an unprecedented climate of anti-communism erupted, partly due to the socialists' position against the Soviet intervention. The PCI found itself, perhaps for the first time, completely isolated, and the crisis of that year, in addition to the social changes characterizing the economic boom, was the main cause of the imposing drop in membership. The PCI lost over 200,000 card-carrying members and from that moment never reached 2,000,000 members again[16].

This crisis, however, demonstrated the strength of the PCI, which, despite everything, managed to withstand the harsh attacks[17]. The VIII Congress of the PCI, held in December 1956, did not appear at all to be that of a party under checkmate, but was rich in analysis and proposals, significantly preceded by imposing debates that had permeated the sections and federations in the preceding months. In that assembly, the Party relaunched its autonomy and, for the first time officially, presented the overcoming of the concept of the "leading party" and an "Italian path to Socialism." The past intuitions of Gramsci and Togliatti, starting with the positions on Italian democracy, were carried forward with greater conviction. The "new type of democracy," understood as a transitional phase that should lead to Socialism at a later stage, the renewal of the Party's leadership class, already begun since 1954, and the autonomy of the trade union were the watchwords of what would be one of the most important congresses in the history of the PCI[18].

The main political consequence of the events of 1956 was the definitive end of the Pact of Unity of Action between the PCI and the PSI. Nenni's PSI, which in previous years had deeply succumbed to the charm of Stalin's Soviet Union[19], reconsidered its position regarding the most important socialist state, completely distancing itself from it. Simultaneously, the PSI made an approach, and this time solitary, to the government area and to the DC and especially the PSDI, which seemed to be reciprocated by a policy of the governing parties increasingly closer to the "opening to the left" (apertura a sinistra)[20].

Despite the advances of the DC and the PSI, the political elections of 1958[21] constituted an unexpected and substantial resilience for the PCI, as the Party confirmed the result of the previous elections. The satisfactory electoral result did not deceive the PCI leadership, conscious both of having the most difficult period behind them and of the urgency of necessary changes in the Party. But everything that had happened in 1956 and the economic miracle had been understood, better than by the Party's ruling class, certainly by the Secretary of the CGIL Giuseppe Di Vittorio[22], who had already confronted, before others, the problem of the relationship with the USSR and the new needs of workers. The trade unionist from Cerignola died on November 3, 1957, while he was in Lecco for a demonstration, but his policy was immediately taken up in the Party, especially by Giorgio Amendola. After the 1958 elections, the possibility of the socialists entering the government came increasingly to the fore, an eventuality that did not meet, at least in those months, fierce opposition from the PCI, which even, in its IX Congress, held in the first months of 1960, expressed willingness to support a "center-left" government. The political conditions that would subordinate the PCI's support were also explicitly stated in the Congress, and they consisted of demands for a less "pro-American" foreign policy and a domestic policy of social and democratic reforms[23]. At the beginning of 1960, the new DC majority, of Dorotean matrix, which had ousted the old Fanfanian majority, in its classic "modus operandi"[24], stalled and kept the PSI on edge regarding its entry into government. It was in this complex political phase that the crisis of the Segni Government occurred. President of the Republic Gronchi entrusted the task of forming a new government to Fernando Tambroni, from the Christian Democratic left, who obtained confidence with the decisive vote of the MSI (Italian Social Movement). Anti-fascist Italy rose up; spontaneous demonstrations spread throughout the Peninsula, and the biggest clashes occurred in Genoa, a city awarded the Gold Medal for the Resistance, where the MSI Congress was scheduled for July 1960. The vehemence of the protests, which went even beyond the predictions of the PCI itself, pushed Tambroni to resign and opened the doors to the "opening to the left" and the "center-left"[25].

[1] Cf. Agosti, op. cit.

[2] Cf. Colarizi, op. cit.

[3] Cf. Cossutta, Una storia comunista, Rizzoli.

[4] Cf. Pistillo, op. cit.

[5] The CGIL was described by La Civiltà Cattolica as an organization working to “undermine the economic foundations of the country and its recovery,” whose “disruptive and subversive” action was subordinated to “the specific aims of the political struggle of a party subservient to a foreign center.” Cf. Pistillo, op. cit.

[6] “After the Liberation, the reconstitution of the FGCI was decided by the Central Committee of the PCI in March 1949. Enrico Berlinguer became its Secretary, a position he held until 1956. Berlinguer gave a strong impulse to the Youth Federation, which in those years reached 450,000 members, and projected it into the international communist movement, becoming in 1950 Secretary of the World Federation of Democratic Youth. Numerous initiatives and campaigns were carried out among Italian youth, and the organization achieved a widespread presence in factories, schools, and universities.
… In the early 1950s, for example, the so-called Movimento dei costruttori was promoted, aimed at stimulating militancy within the organization, and the great movement of peace flags was launched during the escalation of the Cold War. In 1951, on the 30th anniversary of the foundation of the FGCI, Enrico Berlinguer stated that the history of the Youth Federation “has been the history of Italian youth, of its most conscious and socially active part.”
… At the beginning of the 1960s, the dual problem of the difficult relationship with young people and the link with the Party became evident. Membership fell to 200,000, and the Federation intensified its search for an autonomous profile.
Between 1961 and 1966, Achille Occhetto was Secretary of the FGCI.
With the emergence of the 1968 movement, the FGCI went through a very complex phase, and it was Renzo Imbeni, Secretary from 1972 to 1975, who relaunched the Federation’s action.
Massimo D’Alema, Secretary from 1975 to 1980, faced the difficult phase of the 1977 movement and the dark years of the drift toward terrorism.
In the 1980s, the FGCI was led by Marco Fumagalli (1980–1985) and Pietro Folena (1985–1989).
The last Secretary of the FGCI, transformed with the birth of the PDS into Sinistra Giovanile, was Gianni Cuperlo.”
Cf. Numero unico istituzionale di presentazione della storia della Fgci a cura della Direzione nazionale Fgci del P.d.c.i.

[7] Cf. Colarizi, op. cit.

[8] Results of the main parties in the elections for the Chamber of Deputies on 7 June 1953:
PCI 22.6% – DC 40.1% – PSI 12.7%.
The PCI obtained 148 seats in the Chamber and 54 in the Senate.

[9] Cf. Pistillo, op. cit.

[10] Cf. Agosti, op. cit.

[11] Cf. 1906-2006 La Cgil e i tuoi diritti, special issue for the centenary of the CGIL.

[12] Cf. Aldo Agosti, op. cit.

[13] Cf. Aldo Agosti, op. cit.

[14] Togliatti was known as “Il Migliore” (“The Best”) due to widespread appreciation of his political abilities. The nickname was also used by political opponents, obviously in a derogatory sense. Cf. Cossutta, op. cit.

[15] The Party was like a Church and militant discipline like a faith. Giuseppe Di Vittorio, for example, was forced to engage in self-criticism over the position taken regarding the events in Hungary. Cf. Simona Colarizi, op. cit.

[16] PCI membership data from 1957 to 1968:
1957: 1,825,342 members; 1958: 1,818,606; 1959: 1,789,269; 1960: 1,792,974; 1961: 1,728,620; 1962: 1,630,550; 1963: 1,615,571; 1964: 1,641,214; 1965: 1,615,296; 1966: 1,575,935; 1967: 1,534,705; 1968: 1,502,862. Source cited.

[17] Cf. Agosti, op. cit.

[18] Cf. Almanacco Pci ’75, a cura della Sezione centrale stampa e propaganda Pci.

[19] Cf. Andreotti, op. cit.

[20] Cf. Colarizi, op. cit.

[21] Results of the main parties in the elections for the Chamber of Deputies on 25 May 1958:
PCI 22.7% – DC 42.3% – PSI 14.2%.
The PCI obtained 149 seats in the Chamber and 59 in the Senate.

[22] Cf. 1906-2006 La Cgil e i tuoi diritti, special issue for the centenary of the CGIL.

[23] Cf. IX Congresso del Partito comunista italiano. Atti e risoluzioni, Editori Riuniti.

[24] Cf. Chiarante, La Democrazia cristiana, Editori Riuniti.

[25] Cf. Colarizi, op. cit.