Introduction – Italian Communist Party: History of the PCI (1921–1991)

Pier Paolo Pasolini, by defining the PCI as "a country within the country," has, in my point of view, grasped the most significant aspect of the life of Western Europe’s largest and most important Communist Party.

The Italian Communist Party has always been a constant and decisive presence in the history of 20th-century Italy. Indeed, from the moment of its birth until its disappearance, the PCI was a Party that, for better or for worse, left its mark on all the major events in Italian history. During Fascism, it was the only party to be present clandestinely in Italy and to try to oppose, albeit with very limited means, a Regime that otherwise, within national borders, would have been unchallenged. Moreover, the hegemonic role of the PCI during the Resistance cannot be questioned by anyone. And finally, for over forty years the PCI and the DC were the main protagonists of that Italian democracy which, although with different roles, they both contributed to founding and developing.

Therefore, if a positive historical judgment can be rightly given to the DC, the main governing party, the same treatment must be reserved for its antagonist, the PCI, which, despite enduring the conditioning of the Soviet Union in many phases of its existence, continually played a leading role in Italian politics and can be considered to all intents and purposes "another important part of the Country." Otherwise, the reason why the DC itself, with the end of the PCI, ceased to exist would not be explained. And indeed, although Tangentopoli put the final nail in the coffin of the party of the "crusader shield," the DC died only after having concluded its main task, which was to bar the doors of government to the communists. Corruption in Italian politics was a recurring theme throughout the 80s, as demonstrated by the insistence on the “moral question” by a clean leader like Berlinguer, but Tangentopoli, with all its consequences, could only start after the "communist danger" had been defeated.

The PCI was also an important, and in some cases irreplaceable, reference point in the individual histories of millions of women and men of our Country. An immense community, a Party-country that extended throughout the country of Italy and in which "being comrades" and having the PCI membership card in one's pocket constituted an inalienable right of citizenship. In any Italian locality where they found themselves, even the most remote, a PCI comrade could go to a Party section to ask for help or simply to socialize. This is a story that could be told by many southerners who emigrated to the north, to whom the PCI often provided the first welcome and, and this is certainly the most important thing, acted to make them feel “less alone.” And how many other stories could have been told by the farm labourers of Cerignola, whom the Party taught "not to take off their hat in front of the employer" and to demand, with dignity, respect for their rights, thus making them "citizens." When this story ended, many felt orphaned and countless people, families, and friendships were no longer the same. But precisely because this story is over, it could be told. And despite the obvious limitations, it could be told in its entirety, from beginning to end.

I have tried to do this with the work carried out, and the works of those who, in previous years, spent a lot of time of their lives writing about the history of this Party have certainly been invaluable to me. Among these, the greatest of all, the unattainable reference point who unfortunately had to leave his work incomplete, was Spriano, but important contributions also came from Agosti, Galli, Colarizi, regarding the history of Italian politics, and, why not, from Pistillo from San Severo. Why deny that without their commitment a “relatively systematic” work of reconstruction of the national history of the PCI would have been unattainable?

I – The Birth of the Communist Party of Italy (1921)

On January 21, 1921, in the S.Marco theatre in Livorno, the Communist Party of Italy (Pcd’I) was born, the Italian section of the Third International. The place that would give birth to what would later become the largest and most important communist party in Western Europe had been used as a warehouse during the recently concluded war and was, as Terracini[2] recalled, a cramped, unlit place, without chairs or benches, with unglazed windows and a broken roof. Those who constituted the PCI were a minority of the delegates of the XVII Congress of the PSI, which was held in those days in Livorno in another theatre, the Goldoni.

The Socialist Congress had just refused, with only a quarter of the votes against, as stipulated in the 21 conditions for joining the Communist International, to expel the members of the Party's reformist current. The minority, which represented 58,783 members out of 216,337, and which abandoned the Goldoni to meet at the S.Marco, consisted of the "abstentionist" group led by Bordiga, the future first leader of the new Party, the Ordine Nuovo[3] group of Gramsci, Togliatti, Terracini, and Tasca, the maximalist current of Marabini and Graziadei, and the vast majority of the Socialist Youth Federation (FGS)[4]. These groups, in addition to declaring the birth of the new party, also elected a first Central Committee[5], in which the internal balance of power was clearly visible.

The causes that led to the split of the PSI must be sought primarily beyond Italian borders. In fact, the pressures from the new global center of communist politics, the Third International, which was born in Moscow in 1919 and, certain of the possibility of exporting its winning model across Europe, with the 21 conditions it set for joining, demanded, besides the purge of reformist currents, the adoption of the communist name instead of the socialist one. But if it is undeniable that the October Revolution acted as a catalyst, in all countries, for the more revolutionary sectors of the workers' parties, at the same time the peculiarities of the PSI cannot be forgotten, as it had already distinguished itself by its autonomous stance during World War I, when, unlike the other European socialist parties that supported their respective bourgeoisies, it launched the slogan "neither adhere nor sabotage."

Within the Party, political divisions among the three main currents had sharpened, partly due to the post-war situation: the reformist and social-democratic right of Turati, the maximalists of Serrati, who were the true majority of the Party, and the component of Bordiga and Gramsci. But as Agosti recalls, the theoretical analysis was always rather lacking among the socialists of that period[6], who loved to speak of revolution, without ever, and in this the difference with the Bolsheviks was clear, worrying about discussing what to do to achieve it, perhaps relying on its inevitability. These peculiarities of Italian socialism led to the birth of a revolutionary communist party much later than in other European countries, and without sufficient ideological debate, such as the one that had occurred in German social democracy, for example. For these reasons, the paradox was reached that the PCI, which was the party that was supposed to be born to make the revolution, was formed precisely at the moment when the conditions for revolution faded, which were certainly more mature in the two years of 1919-20.

[1] The Pcd’I changed its name to Partito Comunista Italiano (PCI) following the dissolution of the Communist International (Comintern) in 1943. For simplification, we will always use the abbreviation PCI.

[2] Cf. La storia del futuro Livorno 1921–2001, special issue published by the National Directorate of the PRC on the eightieth anniversary of the PCI’s founding.

[3] Ordine Nuovo was a magazine directed by Gramsci and first published on 1 May 1919. The magazine soon became the organ of the Factory Councils. Cf. Mordenti, Introduzione a Gramsci, Datanews Editrice.

[4] The FGS, with 90% of the votes, transformed at its last Congress into the Italian Communist Youth Federation (FGCI). Its first national secretaries were Giuseppe Berti and, after 1923, Giuseppe Dozza, future historic Mayor of Bologna. The FGCI later played an important role, particularly during the Liberation War, with the creation of two parallel organizations: the Youth Front in the North and, after 8 September 1943, the MGC in central and southern Italy.

[5] The 15 members of the Central Committee were, in alphabetical order: Belloni, Bombacci, Bordiga, Fortichiari, Gennai, Gramsci, Grieco, Marabini, Misiano, Parodi, Polano, Repossi, Sessa, Tarsia, Terracini. Of these, eight were Bordighists, five maximalists, and two from Ordine Nuovo. Cf. Togliatti, Gramsci, Editori Riuniti.

[6] Cf. Agosti, Storia del PCI, Editori Laterza.

II – From Bordiga to Gramsci (1921–1926)

In May 1921, the political elections were held, and the communists presented themselves with an autonomous list[1] which gathered only 300,000 votes and 15 Deputies; the PSI, however, retained almost its entire electoral strength, achieving 1,600,000 votes (122 seats). This appointment was marked by disruptive actions by the fascists who tried to prevent many socialists and communists from voting. Against the spread of fascist squadrism, the "Arditi del popolo" (People's Daredevils) were born, a movement that declared itself "apolitical," but which included many socialists and some communists. The very sectarian line of Bordiga's PCI, which forbade its members from participating in the movement, prevented that experience from growing, and it failed miserably. In the II Congress of the PCI in 1922, held in Rome, Bordiga's line was confirmed, based on the exclusion of any kind of agreement with the socialists, and this caused, also due to the split of the reformist wing of the PSI, the first friction with the International, which forcefully raised the issue of reunification with Serrati's PSI.

Meanwhile, Fascism, with the "March on Rome" in October 1922, settled into power, with the tacit consent of the Crown, and Antonio Gramsci realized that Bordiga's policy, which had led to the isolation of the Party, had to be overcome[2]. The PCI, in fact, found itself at that moment in rupture both with the Communist International and with the other forces of the Italian left. It was in this context that Gramsci began to work for a change of majority within the Party and, with the support of the International, founded the so-called "center" group, which opposed the "right" of Tasca and especially the "left" of Bordiga.

Bordiga still held the majority at the clandestine organizational Conference of 1924, but the political weight of the center was growing, as demonstrated by the choice to stand in the 1924 political elections with a single list together with the socialists close to the Third International. The entry into the PCI of the so-called "terzini" (Third International Socialists), including Giuseppe Di Vittorio, marked a significant step in the strengthening of the Party.

In the 1924 elections, held under the Acerbo Law, the PCI maintained its result, despite fascist repression. The regime's crimes, however, culminated with the assassination of Matteotti, an event that opened new spaces for political maneuvering. The "Bolshevization" of the Party, launched at the V Congress of the Communist International, is situated in this context, leading to a profound reorganization based on cells and the new role of the militants.

The definitive handover from Bordiga to Gramsci occurred with the III Congress of the PCI in Lyon in 1926, where the large majority of delegates approved the so-called "Theses of Lyon," an authentic turning point in the history of the Party, based on the alliance between the working class of the North and the peasants of the South.

The task of the Party was to organize and mobilize these forces towards transitional objectives that would lead to the insurrection and the dictatorship of the proletariat[6]. In this framework, Antonio Gramsci was the first to grasp the risks deriving from the internal clashes within the Russian Communist Party after Lenin's death, intuiting the consequences of Stalin's victory well in advance[7].

[1] In these elections, Bordiga was not a candidate because he considered his election to Parliament unnecessary. Cf. Pistillo, Pagine di storia del Partito Comunista Italiano, Piero Lacaita Editore.

[2] Cf. Togliatti, op. cit.

[3] Cf. Spriano, Storia del Partito Comunista Italiano, Einaudi.

[4] Cf. Agosti, op. cit.

[5] Cf. Gramsci in the essay Cinque anni di vita del Partito. The speech is taken from I comunisti e l’unità della classe operaia, edited by the PCI Central Section of Party Schools. In this important text, Gramsci reconstructs the first five years of the Party, acknowledges the necessity of the split from the PSI, but admits the difficulties faced by the PCI in its earliest years, justifying them with the acute crises of the bourgeoisie and the labor movement. After a brief analysis of the early years, Gramsci proceeds to describe “the new course of the Party,” the importance of the Third Congress, and the main political goals and results.

[6] Cf. Agosti, op. cit.

[7] Cf. Spriano, Intervista sulla storia del PCI, edited by Simona Colarizi.

III - The PCI during the Fascist dictatorship (1926-1943)

In 1926, Fascism completed its transformation, and the harsh repression of the State was added, to all intents and purposes, to the actions of the squadrists. During that year, Mussolini had special measures approved that strengthened the powers of the Head of Government, who was no longer required to answer for his actions before Parliament, which was reduced to a simple place of representation. Newspapers were closed and, at the same time, all associations were subjected to police control and, in fact, trade unions were also abolished, with only fascist unions recognized as legitimate interlocutors. Furthermore, municipal and provincial administrations were abolished and replaced by government authorities, the Podestà. Finally, opposition parties were dissolved and the Special Tribunal for the Defense of the State, whose judges were members of the militia or military personnel, was mandated to order imprisonment, or more often, internal exile (confino) for anti-fascists. The so-called "most fascist" laws (leggi "fascistissime") thus constituted the foundation upon which the regime was built, characterized by the substantial coincidence between the structures of the State and the Fascist Party, which thus remained the only political force legitimized to exist. In 1926, Italy therefore ceased to be a liberal State and became a totalitarian State.

The Communist Party was severely hit by repression and its major leaders ended up in prison. During the "twenty years" (of Fascism), the PCI was the anti-fascist party that paid the highest price to repression[1]. The PCI headquarters were moved to Paris, while in Italy an attempt was made to maintain a clandestine organization. With the arrest of Gramsci, Togliatti, who had escaped arrest only because he was abroad, became General Secretary, while, at least initially, the clandestine action in Italy was entrusted to Camilla Ravera. Even though the PCI was the only anti-fascist party that had organized a network of this type, due to the repression by the fascist Police who effectively used the method of "infiltrators," the internal political initiative soon weakened, as evidenced by the number of members, which dropped from 10,000 in 1927 to about 7,000 in 1928[2]. The PCI, which was founded believing that revolution was imminent, was caught by surprise by the consolidation of Fascism, but despite everything, it continued to believe that this political phase would only be a brief authoritarian parenthesis and that the conditions for taking power would soon return.

Relations with the Communist International, which had been greatly strengthened by Togliatti, abruptly deteriorated in 1929 due to the position taken by Tasca, who had replaced Togliatti in Moscow, in favor of Bukharin, who was opposing Stalin at the time. After the entire PCI line, from Lyon onwards, was questioned, Togliatti expelled Tasca and realigned the Party with the International's positions, which, due to Stalin, had become rather sectarian again. In fact, the PCI was forced to associate the theory of "social fascism" with Italian socialists and the young Justice and Liberty (Giustizia e Libertà) movement, a theory based on the equalization between Fascism and Social Democracy, both understood as methods used by the bourgeoisie to maintain power. Furthermore, the hypotheses, advanced in Lyon by Gramsci, of an intermediate phase that should follow the fall of Fascism, were excluded.

These positions caused the most serious crisis the Party had known in its first ten years of life[3]: Gramsci and Terracini, from prison, made their dissenting voices heard, and three national leaders, Leonetti, Ravazzoli, and Tresso, were expelled from the Party. Despite the sectarianism, this change in political direction led to a recovery of the PCI's activity in Italy, which was particularly driven by Longo, and a significant rejuvenation of the militant base. The generational shift from those who had founded the Party to those who had joined it in a clandestine situation laid the foundations for a new rooting of the PCI in society, which would be visible especially in the years following Fascism. The foundations for the birth of the strongholds in Emilia and Tuscany, old socialist strongholds, and the growth in the countryside, can be traced back to that period and those conditions. The PCI had managed to establish itself as the only genuinely active anti-fascist force in Italy, and this had attracted many young people who also came from other cultures, many of whom were from socialist or popular families, and who often went to replace the cadres who ended up in prison. Finally, in the countryside, it was much easier to organize a clandestine network than in the cities.

When Fascism took hold of the levers of consensus, by militarizing, organizing, and channeling the masses, the PCI, even in the face of increased difficulties that prevented action that could be in some way "of the masses," was careful and flexible in understanding the importance of the aforementioned tools. The fascist structures, both because they were the only places where it was possible to talk about politics, and to avoid accusations of "Carbonarism"[4] that the International often leveled at the PCI, became a fundamental catchment area, especially in the years between 1931-32, for propagating communist ideas and, above all, for highlighting the contradictions of the Regime.

With the growth of the Nazi danger, the Communist International changed strategy and between 1934 and 1935 launched the line of uniting all forces opposing the advance of Fascisms in a "popular front." While France was the "pilot country" where the unity of the left was achieved, the situation was slightly different in the Italian anti-fascist parties. The PCI, which had struggled greatly to accept the "turn" of 1929, suffered even more in trying to emerge from the sectarianism to which that turn seemed to have destined it, as, in fascist Italy, the militants had found themselves alone facing the dictatorship. But little by little, the work of Togliatti and Grieco, who was secretary from 1934 to 1938[5], bore fruit, and, in August 1934, the "pact of unity of action" was signed between socialists and communists, which, despite the distinctions, marked the reopening of dialogue between the two workers' parties.

The hope of a possible failure of the Ethiopian campaign, which could have destabilized the Regime, was soon dashed with the Italian victory, and the PCI had no choice but to resume the old strategy of operating within the Fascist mass organizations, launching a campaign of "fraternization towards the brothers in black shirts"[6]. The campaign, which was launched through the appeal published by the "Stato operaio" (Workers' State) titled "The salvation of Italy is the reconciliation of the Italian people!"[7], was not well received by the other anti-fascist forces and the Italian militants of the Party.

With the start of the civil war in Spain, the anti-fascist sentiment regained even greater strength among the left-wing militants. At this point, the PCI Directorate in Paris supported the requests coming from the Party and set aside the line of "fraternization with the fascist masses" to organize solidarity with the Spanish comrades through the "International Brigades," in which 3000 Italian communists enlisted, having Longo and Di Vittorio among their commanders. The Spanish experience was extremely useful, not only because it prepared the Party cadres and militants for what would become the Resistance in Italy, but also because the goal of a "new type of democracy," based on the expulsion of Fascism and the hegemony of the workers' parties and conceived for the Spanish situation, constituted the basis for a much deeper agreement than the previous one between the PSI and the PCI, which was sanctioned by a new "pact of unity of action" in July 1937.

In those months, the anti-fascist front residing abroad began to solidify: the "Popular Union" had already been founded some months earlier, involving the presence of communists, Justice and Liberty, and republicans (later socialists also joined), but the PCI, which was the only organized party also in Italy, was attentive not only to the anti-fascist unity of the exiled parties but also, and above all, to the ability to genuinely influence the country[8]. This clearly pragmatic position ended up overshadowing the equally important programmatic aspects, such as filling the concept of "new type of democracy" with content, to which the other anti-fascist forces seemed to pay more attention.

The political action of the PCI went into crisis due to its relationship with the Soviet Union, primarily because of Stalin's authoritarianism, which forced Togliatti to take a firm stand against the crimes of Trotskyism and the Party to endure the accusation of "insufficient vigilance," which led to many internal problems culminating in the dissolution of the Central Committee. But it was above all the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact that created the biggest difficulties[9], as it was impossible to reconcile anti-fascist unity with the approval of the pact between the Soviets and the Nazis, and the PCI was forced to align itself with the International's positions, which theorized equidistance between the different imperialisms for communists. The situation worsened further when, with the German invasion, the PCI found itself clandestine even in Paris. Togliatti was arrested, but not being recognized, he got off with a few months in prison and, after reorganizing an embryo of the Party's foreign center, went to Moscow where the International, having definitively dissolved the Political Bureau and the Central Committee, entrusted him with the solitary leadership of the PCI.

The situation within the Party, which had deteriorated with the breakaways of Terracini and Ravera, calmed down thanks to Mussolini's Declaration of War on France and England in 1940, which also led to the recreation of the conditions for a new anti-fascist unity, which was sealed in 1941 in Toulouse by an agreement between the PCI, PSI, and GL.

[1] During the Fascist “ventennio,” 4,000 communists were condemned by the Special Tribunal, totaling 230 centuries of imprisonment. Cf. Togliatti, Il Partito, published by the Central Section of Printing and Propaganda of the PCI.

[2] Cf. Agosti, op. cit.

[3] Cf. Pistillo, op. cit.

[4] Cf. Agosti, op. cit.

[5] Bruno Grieco, son of Ruggero Grieco, in the presentation of the book:

“The history of the Communist Party is incomplete: much of the period during which Ruggero Grieco was secretary, from the second half of 1934 to spring 1938, is ignored or summarized in a few pages. Togliatti concealed much of the documentation from that period, fearing the popularity Grieco had gained in Italian antifascist circles, where he was respected for promoting the PCI-PSI Unity of Action Pact, repeated contacts with Giustizia e Libertà, and appeals to Catholics from the Central Committee. It was precisely in those years that the PCI Central Committee broke with the theory of social fascism. Under Grieco, the Central Committee applied all directions received directly or indirectly from Gramsci to build a party that wove the threads of antifascism, preparing the ground for the uprising and the Italian Resistance. Giorgio Amendola first revealed some of these obscure aspects publicly in 1966, stating that Grieco had been party secretary for four years. Grieco himself never told his son Bruno. Archive documents from that period are still ‘restricted.’ Nevertheless, much has been brought to light. The Comintern documents included in the book are revelatory and published for the first time.” Cf. Grieco, Un Partito non stalinista: PCI 1936 “Appello ai fratelli in camicia nera”, Marsilio.

[6] Cf. Agosti, op. cit. and Pistillo, op. cit.

[7] Cf. Agosti, op. cit.

[8] Cf. “Problems and Discussions,” editorial in Stato Operaio, May 15, 1939, taken from Communists and the Unity of the Working Class, curated by the PCI Central Section of Party Schools.

[9] Cf. Pistillo, op. cit.

IV – The Resistance, the Salerno Turn, and the Birth of the “New Party” (1943–1945)

With the German attack on the Soviet Union, the International, which was by then reduced to a branch office of the USSR's "Foreign Ministry," immediately changed its position on the war, switching from the concept of "war of imperialisms" to that of "anti-fascist war." The communist parties were, according to the new strategy, supposed to put aside revolutionary ambitions and relaunch policies of broad convergence with other anti-fascist forces. It was not the subservience to the USSR's positions, which fundamentally had always existed, but the new need not to oppose the capitalist powers allied in the war that led to the dissolution of the International in 1943[1]. In reality, things did not change much in the communist world, as the USSR maintained unquestioned supremacy over the entire movement.

In Italy, from 1941, the PCI, thanks also to the important work of Umberto Massola, began to reorganize the clandestine network and make its voice heard, also through the dissemination of a bulletin, the "Quaderno del lavoratore" (Worker's Notebook), through which the Party's official positions, dictated directly by Togliatti via Radio Moscow, were spread. At the same time, numerous small groups, often with an autonomous political line, regained strength, continuing their internal struggle against Fascism.

On July 25, 1943, Mussolini was forced to resign after being outvoted in the "Grand Council of Fascism," and the sudden end of the fascist Government, with increased room for maneuver and the consequent release of PCI leaders from prison, gave greater vitality to the communists' organization. The line pursued by the PCI in those months, mainly driven by the grassroots, was rather radical and "also demanded the head" of the Monarchy; this position was further strengthened by September 8th and the King's flight.

The weight of the PCI in Italy had become very important also because in Northern Italy the war with the Germans and the fascists of the Salò Republic was still all to be fought, and from the autumn of 1943, communist militants were the predominant part of the clandestine Resistance groups, organized in the "Garibaldi Brigades" in the mountains and in the "GAP" (Patriotic Action Groups) and "SAP" (Patriotic Action Squads) in the cities. Besides armed struggle, the PCI continued its political work by organizing workers and promoting strikes and unrest, especially in the first months of 1944. The Badoglio Government's declaration of war against Germany placed the PCI at a crossroads: to continue the line, requested by the grassroots, of frontal opposition to Badoglio and the Monarchy, or to assume governmental responsibility.

In March 1944, Togliatti, after meeting with Stalin, returned to Italy and implemented what became famous as the "Salerno Turn" (svolta di Salerno), with which the PCI, prioritizing reasons of State over the deposition of the Monarchy, sanctioned its entry into the Government. The entry of the PCI into the Governments formed by Badoglio and the reformist socialist Bonomi was intended by Togliatti as an attempt to establish the Party as a responsible force and a founder of Italian democracy. The now imminent insurrection in the North, in which the PCI, due to its organization, played a hegemonic role, would do the rest. For this reason, Liberation Day on April 25, 1945, was celebrated without the uprisings, controlled by the PCI, leading to any attempt at revolution.

The strategy pursued was that of "progressive democracy," a logical continuation of the "new type of democracy," based on the idea that the participation of the masses in government and political life could, besides eliminating all "residues" of Fascism, introduce significant elements of Socialism into society. To achieve this, it was necessary for the Party to be rebuilt on different foundations and become a "New Party"[2], meaning a modern mass party with deep roots in workplaces and adhering to society. The Party therefore began a constant growth both from the point of view of organization, which developed widely across all Italian cities, and in terms of the number of members, increasing from 500,000 in 1944 to 1,700,000 in 1945, which led it to become the most important and largest communist party in Western Europe.

[1] Cf. Spriano, op. cit.
[2] Cf. Togliatti in “Partito Nuovo” and “Che cosa è il Partito Nuovo”, essays taken from Rinascita, Oct.–Nov.–Dec. 1944.

V – The PCI between government, the Constituent Assembly and the defeat of 18 April 1948 (1946–1948)

The New Party in 1946, after the Liberation, could be considered a reality. The PCI, with its two million members[1], had become the largest mass party in post-war Italy, with exceptional roots in the "red regions"[2], with good strength in the working-class cities of the north and constantly growing in the southern countryside. Paradoxically, the imposing organizational structure did not translate into an identical electoral strength, as in the elections for the Constituent Assembly on June 2, 1946[3], the PCI was clearly surpassed by the DC (Christian Democracy) and, by a few thousand votes, by the PSI (Italian Socialist Party), securing 4,300,000 preferences. The PCI exclusively obtained the consensus of its militants or sympathizers, almost all workers, peasants, or intellectuals, and failed to exert any attractive force towards other social classes, primarily towards the "middle class"[4].

The greatest responsibilities were attributed to the "duplicity" (doppiezza) of the PCI, in other words, that equivocal attitude which was considered unconvincing, and which held together two opposing political visions: the commitment to democratic institutions, which characterized the official line, and the link with the Soviet Union and revolutionary aspirations, conspicuously present among the grassroots and peripheral leaders. Indeed, in the Party militants, the usual dualism that has always characterized the left emerged once again, and persisted for many years, between the so-called "heart," which dreamed of the Revolution and the "Myth of the Soviet Union," and the "brain," which studied the modalities for achieving democracy.

Togliatti, personally, strongly opposed initiatives that exceeded the official line, fearing that they would nullify the important efforts made by the PCI to gain credibility and to be a force that could aspire to democratically achieve the government of the Country. Togliatti, in truth, pursued the democratic choice consistently, and not with "duplicity," as it assumed a strategic value for him, and this choice must not be confused with a "merely parliamentary and legalistic path"[5]. Furthermore, Togliatti, considering the small parties almost superfluous[6], preferred close relations with the other two mass parties, and his political line materialized with the achievement of trade union unity[7], with participation and support for national Governments[8], from 1944 to 1947, and with the climate of collaboration established within the Constituent Assembly. That the fear of being politically marginalized pushed the PCI to seek these convergences is unquestionable[9], but, similarly, the equally undisputed benefits that this political line brought to the young Italian democracy are not questionable.

However, the collaboration in government between the left and the DC did not last long. The difficulties of maintaining policies that were not exactly "popular," typical of a period of austerity like the post-war era, were felt by the left, and especially by the PCI. At the same time, the pressures on the DC from the most conservative wings of the Church and, even more so from the Americans, which manifested themselves clearly in De Gasperi's famous trip to the USA in January 1947, became very strong and no longer avoidable. In fact, Italy, due to its economic fragility, needed financial aid, and the USA made this aid conditional on the Trentino statesman driving the left out of government. The turning point was ratified in May 1947 with the formation of a new De Gasperi Cabinet without the PCI and the PSI: from that moment on, the PCI never re-entered the Government of Italy.

Unlike what happened in the governmental majority, the Constituent Assembly continued its work in the same climate of collaboration, and those days were remembered as one of the finest pages in Italian political history. Palmiro Togliatti’s political foresight should be noted, as evidenced by some sensational positions[10], prioritizing, above all, the birth and growth of Italian democracy, of which the PCI was intended to be one of the pillars. Togliatti, who greatly feared the possible reactions of the Party's grassroots to being kicked out of the government, gave this "democratic response" to disprove all those who asserted that "once communists are in power, they never leave it"[11].

The efforts were rewarded, and in January 1948, the new Constitution was approved, very "advanced" in principles and contents, and its complete implementation represented the main political program that the PCI leveraged in its subsequent forty-five years of life. The political line of the PCI was not liked by the other communist parties, which, at the Szklarska Poreba Conference in Poland in September 1947[12], with particular intensity, especially from the Yugoslav party, put the entire PCI leadership group on trial, which was led by Luigi Longo on that occasion. In this case too, Togliatti, reluctantly, implemented yet another change of direction aimed at conforming the PCI's positions to those of the other communist forces. At the VI Congress of the PCI, held in Milan in January 1948, the original idea of an "Italian path to Socialism" was "set aside" and the organization's propensity towards the "Party of Cadres" more consistent with Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy was accentuated.

The PSI went through an even deeper crisis during that period. The Palazzo Barberini split in January 1947, carried out by Saragat's social democratic group, and which weakened the PSI by at least a third of its electoral consensus, caused a wound in Italy's oldest party that, in fact, was never healed. This event handed over the hegemony of the Italian left to the PCI, from that moment on, and created a reversal in the balance of power atypical for Western Europe, where the presence of a hegemonic and governing Socialist Party and a subordinate Communist Party was more common. Political analysts identified one of the main causes of the blocking of the Italian political system in this "all-Italian" anomaly, defined by the terms "imperfect bipartisanship" or "polarized pluralism," unique in Europe and in democratic countries for not being characterized by that vital democratic mechanism which is alternation[13]. If, on the one hand, with the split, Saragat's PSLI[14] joined the ranks of the small parties gravitating around the DC, creating a very cohesive moderate bloc, on the other hand, Nenni's PSI strengthened the already solid relations with the PCI[15].

The atmosphere leading up to the elections of April 18, 1948[16], was one of a genuine showdown. Two opposing ideas of society faced each other: the left leveraged the sense of vindication of workers and peasants, while the DC, to also win the consensus of those who were not its traditional voters, focused entirely on anti-communism and the values of democracy and freedom[17]. The DC, thanks also to the political help of the Church, which moved its entire imposing structure, and the not just economic help of the USA[18], emerged victorious from that epochal clash, obtaining an absolute majority of seats in Parliament. The Popular Democratic Front, which presented itself with a single symbol bearing the effigy of Garibaldi, remained far below the sum of the votes obtained by the PCI and the PSIUP in 1946. The excessively negative result of the Front is explained not only by the birth of Saragat's list but also by an "Italian political custom": the merger of multiple lists often produces fewer votes than the sum of the individual lists. The victory of the DC in those elections represented a decisive moment in the country's history. Italy decided on April 18, 1948, to be an integral part of the Western camp, and the vote also had the effect of consolidating a democracy based on a multiplicity of parties, and which definitively rejected, unlike the countries of Eastern Europe, the option of socialist democracy.

[1] Membership data show that the PCI exceeded two million members until 1956.
Specifically, PCI membership figures from 1946 to 1956 were:
1946: 2,068,272 members; 1947: 2,252,446; 1948: 2,115,232; 1949: 2,027,271; 1950: 2,112,593; 1951: 2,097,830; 1952: 2,093,540; 1953: 2,134,285; 1954: 2,145,317; 1955: 2,090,006; 1956: 2,035,353.
Cf. Istituto Cattaneo – Archivio Adele (web sources).

[2] In order of importance for PCI grassroots support: Emilia-Romagna, Tuscany, and Umbria.

[3] The Constituent Assembly elections were held on the same day as the referendum that, with 54% of the vote, marked the beginning of the republican era and the end of the monarchy.
Results of the three major parties in the elections for the Constituent Assembly of 2 June 1946:
PCI 18.9% – DC 35.2% – PSI 20.7%.
The PCI obtained 104 seats in the Constituent Assembly.

[4] Cf. Agosti, Storia del Pci, Editori Laterza.

[5] Cf. Pistillo, Pagine di storia del Partito Comunista Italiano, Lacaita Editori.

[6] Cf. Andreotti, Visti da vicino, Rizzoli.
Giulio Andreotti recounts having heard Togliatti state, during a meeting involving all antifascist parties: “small parties, small ideas”.

[7] From 1944, the CGIL (Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro) was re-established through the united commitment of the three main currents: communist, socialist, and Catholic.
National Secretaries of the CGIL from the post-war period until the end of the PCI were: Di Vittorio (1944–1957), Novella (1957–1970), Lama (1970–1986), Pizzinato (1986–1988), Trentin (1988–1994).

[8] PCI ministers in the Bonomi, Parri, and De Gasperi governments were: Togliatti, Scoccimarro, Gullo, Ferrari, Pesenti, Sereni.
Cf. Almanacco Pci 75 and Almanacco Pci 76, Sezione centrale stampa e propaganda Pci.

[9] Cf. Agosti, op. cit.

[10] One PCI position during the Constituent Assembly that caused friction even with the Socialists was the decision not to oppose the continued validity of the Lateran Pacts.
Cf. Colarizi, Storia dei partiti nell’Italia repubblicana, Editori Laterza.

[11] Cf. Pistillo, op. cit.

[12] The conference established an Information Bureau (Cominform), which effectively replaced the Comintern.
Cf. Agosti, op. cit.

[13] Cf. Galli, Storia del Pci, Kaos edizioni; Galli, Il bipartitismo imperfetto. Comunisti e democristiani in Italia, il Mulino; Sartori, Teoria dei partiti e caso italiano, SugarCo.

[14] The PSLI later changed its name to PSDI.

[15] Relations between the PCI and the PSI were already very close before the Liberation, to the point that a merger between the two parties was proposed several times.
Cf. Longo, Ipotesi di una fusione tra comunisti e socialisti and Per la creazione del partito unico della classe operaia e dei lavoratori, essays in I comunisti e l’unità della classe operaia, edited by the PCI Central Party Schools Section.

[16] Results of the two main lists in the elections for the Chamber of Deputies on 18 April 1948:
Popular Democratic Front 31% – DC 48.5%.
The Popular Democratic Front obtained 187 seats in the Chamber and 72 in the Senate.

[17] Cf. Colarizi, op. cit.

[18] US support for the DC took many forms, ranging from radio messages to letters from Italian emigrants in America.
Cf. Pistillo, op. cit.

VI – The Attempt on Togliatti, 1956, and the Years of Centrism in Italy (1948–1960)

In the PCI, the terrible defeat of 1948 did not question Togliatti's leadership, and he remained firmly at the helm of the Party, assisted by deputy secretaries Luigi Longo and Pietro Secchia. The Marxist-Leninist organizational structure, which emerged after the VI Congress[1], facilitated the stable, untroubled maintenance of the leadership group, as also demonstrated in the days following July 14, 1948, when Togliatti himself was the victim of an assassination attempt by a young fanatic. It was Longo and Secchia, at least while Togliatti was fighting between life and death, who took charge of the Party and blocked the attempts at insurrection by the grassroots. In fact, the "best organized areas" of the partisan squads were still active, and they still possessed a decent arsenal, which was continuously increasing also because in those days, the police forces were easily disarmed in many cities[2]. When he was out of danger, Togliatti himself, from his hospital bed, hurried to restore order in the Party with the historic phrase in which he asked the grassroots to "remain calm"[3]. The assassination attempt was not without political consequences: Di Vittorio's CGIL, which had proclaimed a general strike immediately after the attack, split due to the subsequent controversy over this decision, and this very event became, inserted into the changed political conditions, the trigger that caused the split of the Catholic current, which gave rise to the Free CGIL, later CISL, and the social democratic and republican current, which founded the UIL[4].

The years of the first Republican Legislature were not simple for the PCI, subjected as it was to the crossfire of the Government and the Church. The Government, even using means like Scelba's "celere" (riot police), systematically repressed the numerous protest initiatives in factories and the countryside organized by the PCI and the CGIL. The Church, which had already played a very active role in the 1948 elections, continued with propaganda against the PCI and the CGIL[5], which culminated in the excommunication of those who professed to be communists or supported the social-communist lists. The unity with the socialists, which continued in the CGIL and in the red administrations present mainly in Emilia, Tuscany, and Umbria, the Marxist-Leninist organization, the struggles in the factories of the center-north and especially in the southern countryside, and an increasing penetration into Italian culture and society, which became evident, for example, in the fights against nuclear power, prevented the PCI from falling into serious isolation. The peace movements, born after the start of the Korean War in 1950, were also very important for the PCI, engaging the entire Party, with the significant participation of the reconstituted FGCI[6], especially after the VII National Congress held in Rome in April 1951.

After a short time, the Party managed to emerge from this defensive position and returned to growth, resuming its phase of expansion, as evidenced by its advance in the administrative elections of 1951 and 1952[7]. But the most obvious signs of recovery were seen later, especially with the political elections of 1953. De Gasperi's DC, implementing quite a few forcing tactics, had a new electoral law approved that granted, to the coalition that exceeded 50% of the votes, a substantial majority premium that allowed it to reach 65% of the seats. The DC's fear of not repeating the exploit of 1948 was evident, and the reaction of the PCI, actively assisted by the CGIL, which called a new general strike against what was renamed the "fraudulent law" (Legge truffa), was fierce. The centrist coalition, by 57,000 votes, did not reach the absolute majority, and the missed goal, along with the strong decline of the DC[8], marked the end of the De Gasperi era. The PCI, capitalizing on a five-year period of social and political struggles[9], surpassed six million votes, but the satisfaction for the dual result achieved—the failure of the fraudulent law and the undisputed primacy in the Italian left, with almost 10 percentage points over the PSI—was short-lived, as the DC was still firmly in government of the Country, and the left overall still played a marginal political role.

Even social changes did not seem to be moving in a direction that would benefit the PCI. The increased demand for labor pushed large masses of workers towards urban centers, to the north, and abroad, and these workers, having immediate serious problems to solve, were little interested in the ideal struggles for social change[10]. Significant in this regard was the victory of the CISL, at the expense of the CGIL, in the elections for the internal commissions of Fiat in 1955. For the communists of the Party and the CGIL, this was an important opportunity for reflection. Di Vittorio delivered a famous self-criticism in the CGIL Directorate that was destined to change the entire organization of the CGIL[11].

In an attempt to emerge from this uncomfortable situation, the left, especially the PSI, attempted an rapprochement with the government area, and the election of Gronchi as President of the Republic with the decisive vote of the left in 1955 and the abstention of the PCI and PSI on the vote of confidence in the Segni Government at the beginning of 1956[12], were the most important political acts of this strategy. There were also changes in the PCI's organization, as the Marxist-Leninist structure had made plain all the limitations it had in fully grasping all the economic and social changes in the Country. Among the major leaders, Secchia paid the price, losing the position of deputy secretary. The ruling class was gradually renewed, while the Party abandoned, at least partially, the Marxist-Leninist organization to increasingly resume the forms of that "new party" so dear to Togliatti.

1956 was a fundamental year in the history of the PCI. With the XX Congress of the Soviet Communist Party, whose leadership had passed, after Stalin's death in 1953, into the hands of Khrushchev, the entire policy of the most important Soviet dictator was severely criticized, and the use of the "cult of personality" was condemned. The reactions of the PCI, at least initially, were prudent and were limited to emphasizing the innovative nature of the Soviet turning point, highlighting, in particular, the correctness of the original choices that the PCI had made in previous years[13]. It was Togliatti, in the following months, with an interview in the newspaper "Nuovi argomenti" (New Arguments), who initiated a turning point in the PCI's position. The "Migliore" (the Best)[14], emphasizing the excessive bureaucratization of the State, unequivocally denounced the "degenerations" of the Soviet system that had led to the cult of personality. With that stance, Togliatti began to question the very idea of the "Soviet model." But the road that was supposed to lead to full autonomy for the PCI was still long, and when the Polish communist government repressed worker demonstrations by force, the PCI leadership aligned itself with the Soviet Party's positions.

Even more serious and full of consequences was the crisis in Hungary. In that country, vibrant protests similar to those that had occurred in Poland had been ongoing for some months. When the Hungarian Government announced its intention to leave the Warsaw Pact, a very violent Soviet repression was unleashed. The Red Army tanks invaded the country and caused several thousand deaths. In this case too, although with even greater suffering, the PCI was forced to align itself, but the political cost of that decision was extremely high. Some sectors of the Party, and especially the trade union, distanced themselves from the PCI's positions. Among the critical positions, those of Di Vittorio and over a hundred intellectuals within or close to the Party who signed a harsh manifesto of condemnation should be remembered. Despite everything, the criticism, due to the special relationship that bound the Party to its militants[15], did not lead to an immediate exit of the majority of those leaders who had expressed perplexity. But throughout Italy, the situation for the PCI became extremely difficult, and an unprecedented climate of anti-communism erupted, partly due to the socialists' position against the Soviet intervention. The PCI found itself, perhaps for the first time, completely isolated, and the crisis of that year, in addition to the social changes characterizing the economic boom, was the main cause of the imposing drop in membership. The PCI lost over 200,000 card-carrying members and from that moment never reached 2,000,000 members again[16].

This crisis, however, demonstrated the strength of the PCI, which, despite everything, managed to withstand the harsh attacks[17]. The VIII Congress of the PCI, held in December 1956, did not appear at all to be that of a party under checkmate, but was rich in analysis and proposals, significantly preceded by imposing debates that had permeated the sections and federations in the preceding months. In that assembly, the Party relaunched its autonomy and, for the first time officially, presented the overcoming of the concept of the "leading party" and an "Italian path to Socialism." The past intuitions of Gramsci and Togliatti, starting with the positions on Italian democracy, were carried forward with greater conviction. The "new type of democracy," understood as a transitional phase that should lead to Socialism at a later stage, the renewal of the Party's leadership class, already begun since 1954, and the autonomy of the trade union were the watchwords of what would be one of the most important congresses in the history of the PCI[18].

The main political consequence of the events of 1956 was the definitive end of the Pact of Unity of Action between the PCI and the PSI. Nenni's PSI, which in previous years had deeply succumbed to the charm of Stalin's Soviet Union[19], reconsidered its position regarding the most important socialist state, completely distancing itself from it. Simultaneously, the PSI made an approach, and this time solitary, to the government area and to the DC and especially the PSDI, which seemed to be reciprocated by a policy of the governing parties increasingly closer to the "opening to the left" (apertura a sinistra)[20].

Despite the advances of the DC and the PSI, the political elections of 1958[21] constituted an unexpected and substantial resilience for the PCI, as the Party confirmed the result of the previous elections. The satisfactory electoral result did not deceive the PCI leadership, conscious both of having the most difficult period behind them and of the urgency of necessary changes in the Party. But everything that had happened in 1956 and the economic miracle had been understood, better than by the Party's ruling class, certainly by the Secretary of the CGIL Giuseppe Di Vittorio[22], who had already confronted, before others, the problem of the relationship with the USSR and the new needs of workers. The trade unionist from Cerignola died on November 3, 1957, while he was in Lecco for a demonstration, but his policy was immediately taken up in the Party, especially by Giorgio Amendola. After the 1958 elections, the possibility of the socialists entering the government came increasingly to the fore, an eventuality that did not meet, at least in those months, fierce opposition from the PCI, which even, in its IX Congress, held in the first months of 1960, expressed willingness to support a "center-left" government. The political conditions that would subordinate the PCI's support were also explicitly stated in the Congress, and they consisted of demands for a less "pro-American" foreign policy and a domestic policy of social and democratic reforms[23]. At the beginning of 1960, the new DC majority, of Dorotean matrix, which had ousted the old Fanfanian majority, in its classic "modus operandi"[24], stalled and kept the PSI on edge regarding its entry into government. It was in this complex political phase that the crisis of the Segni Government occurred. President of the Republic Gronchi entrusted the task of forming a new government to Fernando Tambroni, from the Christian Democratic left, who obtained confidence with the decisive vote of the MSI (Italian Social Movement). Anti-fascist Italy rose up; spontaneous demonstrations spread throughout the Peninsula, and the biggest clashes occurred in Genoa, a city awarded the Gold Medal for the Resistance, where the MSI Congress was scheduled for July 1960. The vehemence of the protests, which went even beyond the predictions of the PCI itself, pushed Tambroni to resign and opened the doors to the "opening to the left" and the "center-left"[25].

[1] Cf. Agosti, op. cit.

[2] Cf. Colarizi, op. cit.

[3] Cf. Cossutta, Una storia comunista, Rizzoli.

[4] Cf. Pistillo, op. cit.

[5] The CGIL was described by La Civiltà Cattolica as an organization working to “undermine the economic foundations of the country and its recovery,” whose “disruptive and subversive” action was subordinated to “the specific aims of the political struggle of a party subservient to a foreign center.” Cf. Pistillo, op. cit.

[6] “After the Liberation, the reconstitution of the FGCI was decided by the Central Committee of the PCI in March 1949. Enrico Berlinguer became its Secretary, a position he held until 1956. Berlinguer gave a strong impulse to the Youth Federation, which in those years reached 450,000 members, and projected it into the international communist movement, becoming in 1950 Secretary of the World Federation of Democratic Youth. Numerous initiatives and campaigns were carried out among Italian youth, and the organization achieved a widespread presence in factories, schools, and universities.
… In the early 1950s, for example, the so-called Movimento dei costruttori was promoted, aimed at stimulating militancy within the organization, and the great movement of peace flags was launched during the escalation of the Cold War. In 1951, on the 30th anniversary of the foundation of the FGCI, Enrico Berlinguer stated that the history of the Youth Federation “has been the history of Italian youth, of its most conscious and socially active part.”
… At the beginning of the 1960s, the dual problem of the difficult relationship with young people and the link with the Party became evident. Membership fell to 200,000, and the Federation intensified its search for an autonomous profile.
Between 1961 and 1966, Achille Occhetto was Secretary of the FGCI.
With the emergence of the 1968 movement, the FGCI went through a very complex phase, and it was Renzo Imbeni, Secretary from 1972 to 1975, who relaunched the Federation’s action.
Massimo D’Alema, Secretary from 1975 to 1980, faced the difficult phase of the 1977 movement and the dark years of the drift toward terrorism.
In the 1980s, the FGCI was led by Marco Fumagalli (1980–1985) and Pietro Folena (1985–1989).
The last Secretary of the FGCI, transformed with the birth of the PDS into Sinistra Giovanile, was Gianni Cuperlo.”
Cf. Numero unico istituzionale di presentazione della storia della Fgci a cura della Direzione nazionale Fgci del P.d.c.i.

[7] Cf. Colarizi, op. cit.

[8] Results of the main parties in the elections for the Chamber of Deputies on 7 June 1953:
PCI 22.6% – DC 40.1% – PSI 12.7%.
The PCI obtained 148 seats in the Chamber and 54 in the Senate.

[9] Cf. Pistillo, op. cit.

[10] Cf. Agosti, op. cit.

[11] Cf. 1906-2006 La Cgil e i tuoi diritti, special issue for the centenary of the CGIL.

[12] Cf. Aldo Agosti, op. cit.

[13] Cf. Aldo Agosti, op. cit.

[14] Togliatti was known as “Il Migliore” (“The Best”) due to widespread appreciation of his political abilities. The nickname was also used by political opponents, obviously in a derogatory sense. Cf. Cossutta, op. cit.

[15] The Party was like a Church and militant discipline like a faith. Giuseppe Di Vittorio, for example, was forced to engage in self-criticism over the position taken regarding the events in Hungary. Cf. Simona Colarizi, op. cit.

[16] PCI membership data from 1957 to 1968:
1957: 1,825,342 members; 1958: 1,818,606; 1959: 1,789,269; 1960: 1,792,974; 1961: 1,728,620; 1962: 1,630,550; 1963: 1,615,571; 1964: 1,641,214; 1965: 1,615,296; 1966: 1,575,935; 1967: 1,534,705; 1968: 1,502,862. Source cited.

[17] Cf. Agosti, op. cit.

[18] Cf. Almanacco Pci ’75, a cura della Sezione centrale stampa e propaganda Pci.

[19] Cf. Andreotti, op. cit.

[20] Cf. Colarizi, op. cit.

[21] Results of the main parties in the elections for the Chamber of Deputies on 25 May 1958:
PCI 22.7% – DC 42.3% – PSI 14.2%.
The PCI obtained 149 seats in the Chamber and 59 in the Senate.

[22] Cf. 1906-2006 La Cgil e i tuoi diritti, special issue for the centenary of the CGIL.

[23] Cf. IX Congresso del Partito comunista italiano. Atti e risoluzioni, Editori Riuniti.

[24] Cf. Chiarante, La Democrazia cristiana, Editori Riuniti.

[25] Cf. Colarizi, op. cit.

VII – The PCI and the center-left, Togliatti’s death and Luigi Longo’s secretaryship (1960‑1968)

With the country's economic boom, new policies aimed at the redistribution of wealth became necessary so that the working class, by improving its standard of living, could also "consume" Italian products. The involvement of at least a part of the political representation of the working class in these new choices then became an unavoidable element, and the PSI, starting in 1956, began, distancing itself from the PCI, to approach the DC.

The new turning point in Italian politics was the result of the work of the Apulian statesman Aldo Moro who, with sudden accelerations and abrupt decelerations, set the pace for the rapprochement operation, with the Fanfani Government, also known as the "parallel convergences" government, and the entry of Nenni's socialists, with his three Governments from 1963 to 1968. The PCI, in its majority[1], while aware that the centre-left would put an end to the unity of the workers' forces, identified a ** more advanced terrain of struggle** in the new political framework, and this position was strengthened by the X Congress of the PCI which, held in December 1962, besides strongly supporting the establishment of the new Regional Authority and the expansion of the powers of local autonomies in general, dwelt at length on the potential of the new political phase. The main objective that Togliatti's PCI asked of the centre-left should have been the implementation of the Constitution[2].

The PCI's political line in these years towards the Government could be summarized as "soft" opposition in Parliament, but which returned to being harsh in the squares and in the Country[3]. This position brought undeniable benefits to the PCI and the 1963 elections[4] saw a consistent advance of the communists. The brilliant result, achieved despite the constant decline in membership in recent years, demonstrated that the PCI had begun to gain consensus even beyond its traditional electorate and that it had made the most of the new political spaces that had been created with the entry of the PSI into the Government. With these elections, the PCI, making inroads also into the so-called opinion electorate, began that ascent which in a few years would lead the Party to constantly decrease the distance from the DC until the possibility, which occurred only in the European elections of 1984, of achieving the long-awaited "overtaking". Besides a slight decline for the socialists, it should be remembered, from that election round, the large shift of votes from the DC to the PLI (Italian Liberal Party), which gained 3.5% of the votes compared to 1958, reaching 7%. A substantial slice of the electorate had not appreciated the DC's shift to the left and had moved to the more reassuring, and more conservative, liberal shores.

In subsequent years, Aldo Moro's aim became clearer: to keep the Christian Democratic "centrality" intact, and it can be affirmed that at least that objective was achieved if one considers the programmatic contents, which were not properly reformist, of the governments and the difficulties the PSI encountered in those years, crushed between the DC and the PCI, in justifying its role in Government[5]. The PCI, fearing that a successful centre-left could strengthen the "convention ad excludendum" against it, calmed down when it acknowledged the difficulties of the Moro Governments[6] and resumed its maneuvers by continually attacking the PSI and working to push the left wing of that same party towards a split.

On August 21, 1964, Palmiro Togliatti died in Yalta. His funeral, which saw the participation of over a million people, constituted the most imposing moment of popular participation that the young Italian Republic had known up to that moment. Togliatti's last document, which constituted the political testament of the "Migliore" (Best) and was remembered as the "Yalta memorial," reiterated the originality and diversity of paths that would allow the construction of socialist societies, the "unity in diversity" of the international communist movement.

The PCI left by Togliatti was a Party which, while continuing to remain anchored to "democratic centralism," began to feel the need to make visible the different sensibilities and political options within it. The first Congress after the death of the "Migliore," the XI held in January 1966, was the scene of the first confrontation that took place "in broad daylight" since the birth of the New Party. The two political lines that faced each other were the "right" of Amendola, who demanded unity with the socialists and an urgent reform of the State Institutions in the direction of greater democratic participation, and the "left" of Ingrao, who saw mass organization as the best response to the new workers' conflictuality that had re-emerged in those years. Amendola, although he did not have an absolute majority on his own, put Ingrao in the minority. Ingrao's dissenting vote, due to the authority of the communist exponent who enjoyed widespread consensus both inside and outside the Party, sanctioned, for the first time, the legitimacy of political dissent.

The work of synthesis, aimed at "renewal in continuity," between the different souls of the Party sealed the leadership of Luigi Longo, elected General Secretary after Togliatti's death and a worthy successor to the policies of the deceased leader. The two strongest candidates for the role of Togliatti's successor were Amendola and Ingrao, but Longo, for the guarantees of unity and continuity provided by his figure, who had held the position of deputy secretary with Togliatti and had always loyally and effectively assisted the Secretary, constituted the best solution for the Party's secretariat[7]. As Armando Cossutta rightly recalled, "if Togliatti was the great protagonist of the political line and strategy of the communists, Longo was the intelligent constructor of it"[8]. From then on, the task of assisting Longo was entrusted to the young Enrico Berlinguer. It was clear to everyone that the Party, with that move, had already chosen its future leader[9]. But on the other hand, despite the Ingrao case being considered of undoubted political and historical value, the events of the following years, primarily the affair of the "Manifesto" group, demonstrated that the road that should have led the PCI to overcome the method of "democratic centralism" was still entirely ahead of it.

The 1968 elections[10] clearly showed that the main losers in the centre-left Governments were the socialists. To give greater strength to the left area that was governing the Country and to definitively isolate the PCI, the PSI and the PSDI had formed the PSU (Unified Socialist Party). The new party, which set the ambitious goals of competing with the communists for the hegemony of the left on the one hand and creating the conditions for the "alternative to the DC" on the other, was soundly defeated in the electoral round of May of one of the "hottest" years in Italian history. The PSU obtained, also due to the split of the left wing of the PSI which formed the PSIUP[11], much less than the sum of what the two parties composing it had obtained in the previous elections, and the debacle led to the decline of the "third force" option and, shortly thereafter, to a new split between the PSI and the PSDI. On the other hand, the DC recovered, probably on its right, 0.8%, while the true winners were the communists, who derived the greatest advantages from the centre-left's lack of answers and slowly continued their ascent, dismissing all the rumored hypotheses of crisis.

[1] Cf. Rossanda “La ragazza del secolo scorso”, Einaudi.
[2] Cf. Agosti op. cit.
[3] Cf. Colarizi op. cit.
[4] Results of the major parties in the elections for the Chamber of Deputies, April 28, 1963:
PCI 25.3% – DC 38.3% – PSI 13.8%.
The PCI obtained 175 seats in the Chamber and 85 in the Senate.
[5] Cf. Rossanda op. cit.
[6] Aldo Moro, unanimously considered among the best Italian politicians, was not equally great as a statesman. His eternal mediations, which had achieved numerous and indisputable political successes, clashed with the need for immediate decision-making typical of someone in government. Cf. Pietra “Moro fu vera gloria?”, Garzanti, cf. Andreotti op. cit., cf. Colarizi op. cit.
[7] Cf. Rossanda op. cit.
[8] Cossutta, op. cit.
[9] Supporting Longo in the Party’s leadership was an opportunity for Berlinguer to mature before assuming the most prestigious office. Berlinguer’s weight continued to grow in the following years, also due to Longo’s illness in the later years of his secretaryship, which prevented full political activity.
[10] Results of the major parties in the elections for the Chamber of Deputies, May 19, 1968:
PCI 26.9% – DC 39.1% – PSU 14.5%.
The PCI obtained 177 seats in the Chamber and 101 in the Senate (with the PSIUP).
[11] The majority part of the PSIUP merged into the PCI in 1972. Of its two internal minorities, the larger formed the PDUP and the smaller returned to the PSI.

VIII - The PCI between the Prague Spring, the '68 movement, and the rupture with the Manifesto group (1968–1972)

With the advance of conservative forces, the PCI had the urgent need to emerge from a situation of stagnation, and the first response was given during the XIII Party Congress, in March 1972, by the newly appointed General Secretary Enrico Berlinguer who, in his introductory speech, proposed a "government of democratic change" that would see the collaboration of the three main popular currents: communist, socialist, and Catholic[1]. In that context, the unity of the left was a "necessary, but not sufficient condition."

A new turning point occurred in 1973 in the aftermath of Pinochet's coup d'état in Chile against Allende's left-wing government. Berlinguer, fearing that democracy in Italy might also be in danger, relaunched, with an article in Rinascita, the line of a "historic compromise," an alliance among the three popular parties in defense of democratic Institutions[2]. Berlinguer saw the Christian Democracy (DC) not as a monolithic and conservative party, but as a constantly evolving force, within which, besides reactionary forces, important popular elements were present that could, and should, be convinced to collaborate with the PCI. In the following years, the PCI leader continued to pursue this political line, broadening it and going so far as to propose an alliance with the DC that was no longer just defensive, but also programmatic, setting ambitious and advanced objectives, to the point of hypothesizing a governing majority that, by fusing Catholic solidarity with the struggles of the communists, could aim for the overcoming of the system with the gradual introduction of elements of socialism[3].

The first fruits of the "sixty-eight" season were seen in 1974 with the referendum for the repeal of the Divorce Law, approved in 1970. The Christian Democrat secretary Fanfani pushed his party into extremist positions and wanted a referendum at all costs, which the PCI, even ready for concessions, would have wanted to avoid[4]. But when the referendum was officially called, the PCI immediately committed itself and deployed all its organizational strength for the "No" vote, and the results were surprising. The "No" vote overwhelmingly won, reaching 60% of the votes, demonstrating how much Italian society had actually changed in the years following 1968. The many people, even those not affiliated with parties, who mobilized for the "No" vote also demonstrated a desire for participation that could not be underestimated. The PCI itself constantly increased its membership during these years[5], once again becoming the party with the most members in 1976, after 13 years in which the DC had held the record.

The fact that the Country had shifted "to the left" clearly and unequivocally emerged in the administrative elections of 1975. Before those elections, the PCI only governed the three "red regions" and very few other provinces and capital municipalities outside Emilia, Tuscany, and Umbria[6]. After the big bang of June 15, 1975, the PCI, with the PSI and in some cases also with the PSDI and PRI, found itself in the majority in six regions, adding Piedmont, Liguria, and Lazio to the governments in the three usual red regions[7], in half of the provinces[8], in 40% of the capital municipalities[9], in a third of all Italian municipalities, and in almost all major cities[10]. In percentage terms, the PCI exceeded 30 percent for the first time, reaching 33.4% against 35.2% for the DC, and the hypothesis of overtaking became realistic for the subsequent elections.

The Party's steering bodies, elected in March 1975 at the XIV Congress, "emptied out," and many cadres went to fill institutional positions in local administrations[11]. The Party throughout Italy had to confront at this point the problems of governance and program implementation, in regions, provinces, and cities where, having never been administered by the left, there were expectations of change, both among citizens and members or militants, that had grown during the PCI's many years in opposition[12]. In the Congress, Berlinguer, besides abandoning the idea of Italy leaving NATO, had relaunched the strategy of the "historic compromise"[13] and broadened its horizons from a perspective for a new government to a democratic transformation of society. In that assembly, Berlinguer, considering the widespread corruption within the parties, also strongly raised the so-called "moral question" which was based on the recovery of the "sense of the State" by parties and political actors[14].

The political elections of June 20, 1976[15] were approached with the awareness that the Christian Democratic supremacy was for the first time in question, and the "fear of the communist overtaking" reappeared among the moderate electorate, which resulted in all moderate votes flowing into the DC lists and emptying the minor lists, starting with the PLI, which fell below 2% in that electoral competition. The DC maintained the relative majority, while the PCI, despite reaching its historical maximum with 34.4%, failed to endanger Christian Democratic supremacy. But the polarization of the electorate on the two major parties, which together reached almost three-quarters of the votes, made collaboration between the DC and the PCI in government necessary. A first official act of rapprochement between the DC and the PCI occurred with the election of Ingrao as President of the Chamber[16].

Despite the diffidence of the USA, the DC and the PCI, with the tireless work of their leaders Aldo Moro, who, despite not being the DC secretary, deeply influenced its line[17], and Enrico Berlinguer, reached an agreement for the formation of a single-party Christian Democrat government chaired by Giulio Andreotti which saw the abstention of the PCI. The result achieved, which still did not fully satisfy the PCI[18], meant that Berlinguer's Party, breaking the anti-communist precondition, re-entered the governing area after an almost thirty-year wait.

Obviously, the PCI hoped that this was only the first step towards a broader assumption of responsibility, but on the other hand, the DC's strategy, which aimed to wear down the Communist Party and slow down the PCI's actual entry into government, yielded much better results. The PCI, while achieving some small results from the Government despite the worsening economic situation caused by inflation, found itself in the uncomfortable situation of having responsibility without effective power, while pressure from the grassroots grew ever stronger[19].

The real problems, in fact, the PCI had on its left, where the fracture with the extra-parliamentary area, which had been latent until that moment, had become much deeper. The popular movement of 1977, dominated by the "Worker Autonomy" area[20], took on very radical tones of criticism towards the PCI's political line, which, for its part, seemed increasingly to accept the "two-stage" policy, which subordinated reforms to economic recovery, and which had been contested against the socialists at the time of the centre-left. The protest was also marked by sensational gestures, such as the expulsion of Lama, general secretary of the CGIL, from the University of Rome in February 1977[21], and above all by widespread violence characterized by significant clashes between demonstrators and police forces.

The birth and subsequent growth of "red" terrorist groups further complicated the PCI's situation, which found itself constrained between the difficulty of pushing the DC for "more advanced" responses from the Government and the need to assume a role of responsibility that would isolate the terrorists. When the PCI managed to obtain something more concrete from the DC, namely the agreement that would recognize the Party's entry into the government majority, the most important terrorist group, the Red Brigades (Brigate Rosse), carried out the most serious terrorist attack in the history of the Italian Republic: the kidnapping of Aldo Moro[22].

On March 16, 1978, the Parliament was debating confidence in the new Andreotti Government, called "national solidarity," which sanctioned the new agreement between the DC and the PCI. The BR kidnapped, with a bloody massacre, the Christian Democrat leader, the main proponent of the new political agreement, and, after long negotiations that divided Italy and the political parties, they killed him. The PCI was forced to maintain confidence in a government that did not keep any of its promises of change and which, in any other situation, it would certainly have opposed.

The PCI managed to disengage from the government only in January 1979 and paid dearly for the delay, certainly not intentional, with which this position matured[23]. The XV PCI Congress in April 1979 tried to re-weave the threads of the Party after the traumatic experiences of those years and relaunched, in place of national solidarity, the strategy of "democratic alternative" which would see lay and Catholic forces as protagonists[24]. Berlinguer reaffirmed the link between democracy and socialism and linked the PCI, in a perspective of transformation, to the other European communist parties, especially the French and Spanish ones, in a meeting that was called "Eurocommunism," or a "third way" between Social Democracy and real Socialism[25].

[1] Cf. Agosti, History of the Italian Communist Party 1921–1991, Laterza Publishers.
[2] Cf. Rossanda, The Girl of the Last Century, Einaudi.
[3] Cf. Rossanda, op. cit.
[4] Cf. Rossanda, op. cit.
[5] Cf. Agosti, op. cit.
[6] The close relationship with the student movement led some to speak of the workers’ movement as “an Italian case.” Cf. Grisoni and Portelli, Workers’ Struggles in Italy from 1960 to 1976, Rizzoli Universal Library.
[7] Cf. PCI Almanac ’75, curated by the PCI Central Press and Propaganda Section.
[8] Cf. Agosti, op. cit.
[9] Cf. Zavoli, The Night of the Republic, L’Unità.
[10] Cf. Colarizi, History of Parties in Republican Italy, Laterza Publishers.
[11] Cf. AA.VV., Italy of P2, Arnoldo Mondadori Publisher.
[12] Results of major parties in the elections for the Chamber of Deputies, May 7, 1972: PCI 27.1% - DC 38.7% - PSI 9.6%. PCI obtained 188 seats in the Chamber and 94 in the Senate (with PSIUP).
[13] List formed by MSI and Monarchists.

IX - The PCI under Berlinguer, from the 1970s to the kidnapping of Aldo Moro (1972-1979)

 With the rise of conservative forces, the PCI urgently needed to overcome political stagnation. The first response came during the XIII Congress in March 1972, when newly appointed General Secretary Enrico Berlinguer proposed a “government of democratic breakthrough” involving collaboration among the three main popular currents: communist, socialist, and Catholic. In this context, leftist unity was a “necessary but not sufficient condition.”

A new turn occurred in 1973 after Pinochet's coup in Chile against Allende’s leftist government. Fearing threats to democracy in Italy, Berlinguer relaunched, via Rinascita, the line of a “Historic Compromise,” an alliance defending democratic institutions among the three popular parties. He saw the Christian Democrats not as a monolithic conservative party but as an evolving force, containing significant popular elements that could be persuaded to cooperate with the PCI. Over the following years, Berlinguer expanded this strategy, proposing an alliance with the DC not only defensive but also programmatic, aiming at a governing majority that could gradually integrate socialist elements by combining Catholic solidarism with communist struggles.

The first tangible results of the “’68 wave” appeared in 1974 with the divorce law referendum. DC leader Fanfani pushed his party toward rigid positions, forcing a referendum the PCI had wanted to avoid. Once the referendum was called, the PCI mobilized fully for the “No” vote, which won overwhelmingly with 60%, showing how Italian society had changed since 1968. Many participants, even non-party members, demonstrated a strong desire for political engagement. During these years, PCI membership grew steadily, and by 1976 it regained the top position in terms of membership, after 13 years under DC.

The leftward shift of the country became clear in the 1975 local elections. Prior to these elections, the PCI only administered the three traditional “red regions” plus a few other provinces and cities outside Emilia, Tuscany, and Umbria. After June 15, 1975, with the PSI and sometimes PSDI and PRI, the PCI governed six regions, half of all provinces, 40% of provincial capitals, one-third of Italian municipalities, and nearly all major cities. For the first time, the PCI surpassed 30% of votes, reaching 33.4% against DC’s 35.2%, making the prospect of overtaking DC increasingly realistic.

The Party leadership elected at the XIV Congress in March 1975 was depleted as many cadres took institutional roles at local levels. The PCI faced governance challenges in regions, provinces, and cities historically ungoverned by the left, with high expectations for change. In the Congress, Berlinguer abandoned the idea of leaving NATO, reinforced the “Historic Compromise” strategy, and emphasized the “moral question,” promoting a renewed sense of state responsibility among parties and politicians.

The 1976 national elections saw DC primacy questioned for the first time. Fear of a “communist takeover” drove moderate voters to DC, while minor parties collapsed. DC retained a relative majority, and the PCI reached its historical peak with 34.4%, still unable to threaten DC supremacy. Yet the electorate polarization between the two main parties, almost three-quarters of votes combined, made cooperation between DC and PCI necessary. The first official step was Pietro Ingrao’s election as Speaker of the Chamber.

Despite US skepticism, DC and PCI, through the tireless work of Aldo Moro and Berlinguer, agreed on a one-party DC government led by Andreotti with PCI abstention. This marked the first time in nearly 30 years the PCI re-entered government, breaking the anti-communist prejudice.

While hoping for broader responsibilities, PCI faced the DC strategy to slow its government integration. Although achieving minor results, the PCI was in the uncomfortable position of responsibility without real power, facing increasing pressure from its base.

The main problems arose from the left, where the split with the extra-parliamentary area deepened. The 1977 popular movement, led by “Autonomia Operaia,” became highly critical of PCI policies, which appeared to adopt a “two-step” strategy subordinating reforms to stabilization. Protests included dramatic incidents, like the expulsion of CGIL secretary Lama from Rome University in February 1977, and widespread violent clashes between demonstrators and police.

The rise of the “Red” terrorist groups further complicated the PCI’s situation, caught between pushing DC for more government responses and assuming responsibility to isolate terrorists. When PCI obtained agreement from DC to join the government majority, the Red Brigades executed Italy’s deadliest terrorist attack: the kidnapping of Aldo Moro.

On March 16, 1978, Parliament debated confidence in the new Andreotti “national solidarity” government, formalizing DC-PCI cooperation. The Red Brigades kidnapped and murdered Aldo Moro, Italy’s leading proponent of the new political agreement. PCI was forced to maintain confidence in a government that failed to deliver promised changes.

PCI disengaged from government in January 1979, paying a high price for the delay. The XV Congress in April 1979 sought to rebuild the Party and promoted a strategy of “democratic alternative” with secular and Catholic forces. Berlinguer reaffirmed the link between democracy and socialism, connecting PCI with other European communist parties, especially French and Spanish, in a movement called “Eurocommunism,” a “third way” between Social Democracy and real socialism.

[1] Cf. Almanacco PCI ‘75, curated by the PCI Central Press and Propaganda Section.
[2] Cf. Agosti, op. cit.
[3] Cf. Veltroni, La sfida interrotta. Le idee di Enrico Berlinguer, Baldini & Castaldi.
[4] Cf. Chiarante, La Democrazia Cristiana, Editori Riuniti.
[5] PCI membership data 1969–1976: 1969: 1,503,816; 1970: 1,507,047; 1971: 1,521,642; 1972: 1,584,659; 1973: 1,623,082; 1974: 1,657,825; 1975: 1,730,453; 1976: 1,814,262. Source cited.
[6] Cf. Almanacco PCI ‘76, curated by the PCI Central Press and Propaganda Section.
[7] PCI only administered six regions simultaneously in 1976. Historical regional councils with PCI presence included: Emilia Romagna, Tuscany, Umbria, Piedmont, Liguria, Lazio, Sardinia, Valle d’Aosta. Sicily (1958–1960) had an atypical majority under ex-DC Silvio Milazzo including PCI support. PCI never administered Lombardy, Veneto, Friuli Venezia Giulia, Trentino-Alto Adige, Marche, Abruzzo, Molise, Campania, Apulia, Basilicata, Calabria.
[8] Leftist provincial councils formed 1975–1976 in 46 of 92 provinces: Alessandria, Turin, Vercelli, Genoa, La Spezia, Savona, Cremona, Mantua, Milan, Pavia, Rovigo, Venice, Bologna, Ferrara, Forlì, Modena, Parma, Piacenza, Ravenna, Reggio Emilia, Arezzo, Florence, Grosseto, Livorno, Pisa, Pistoia, Massa Carrara, Siena, Ancona, Ascoli, Pesaro, Perugia, Terni, Rieti, Pescara, Teramo, Avellino, Naples, Salerno, Matera, Foggia, Taranto, Cagliari, Nuoro, Sassari, Cosenza.
[9] Leftist councils formed 1975–1976 in 39 of 95 provincial capitals: Aosta, Alessandria, Asti, Turin, Vercelli, Genoa, Imperia, La Spezia, Savona, Cremona, Mantua, Milan, Pavia, Venice, Bologna, Ferrara, Forlì, Modena, Parma, Piacenza, Ravenna, Reggio Emilia, Arezzo, Florence, Grosseto, Livorno, Pisa, Pistoia, Massa Carrara, Siena, Ancona, Pesaro, Perugia, Terni, Rome, Rieti, Naples, Sassari, Cosenza.
[10] Leftist administrations 1975–1976: Rome, Milan, Naples, Turin, Genoa, Florence, Bologna; practically all major cities except Palermo, Catania, Bari.
[11] Cf. Cossutta, Stefanini, Zangheri, Decentramento e partecipazione, Editori Riuniti.
[12] Cf. Agosti, op. cit.
[13] Cf. Berlinguer, Attualità e futuro, L’Unità; Veltroni, op. cit.
[14] Cf. Veltroni, op. cit.
[15] 1976 national election results: PCI 34.4%, DC 38.6%, PSI 9.6%; PCI seats: 227 Chamber, 116 Senate.
[16] In subsequent legislatures, assigning the Chamber presidency to PCI, then opposition, became customary. Pietro Ingrao’s seat later taken by Nilde Iotti.
[17] Cf. Gorresio, Pansa, Tornabuoni, Trent’anni dopo. Il regime democristiano nella tempesta, Tascabili Bompiani.
[18] Cf. Rossanda, op. cit.
[19] Cf. Agosti, op. cit.; Rossanda, op. cit.
[20] Cf. AA.VV., Settantasette, DeriveApprodi.
[21] Cf. AA.VV., Settantasette, DeriveApprodi.
[22] Cf. Zavoli, C’era una volta la Prima Repubblica, Mondadori; Zavoli, La notte della Repubblica, L’Unità.
[23] Cf. Agosti, op. cit.
[24] Cf. Berlinguer, op. cit.
[25] Cf. Di Napoli, L’Eurocomunismo tra storia e cronistoria, Edizioni Paoline.